Japan's Public Diplomacy as an Effective Tool in Enhancing its Soft Power in Vietnam: A case-study of the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program by Duong, Thi Thu
Japan’s Public Diplomacy as an Effective Tool in Enhancing its Soft Power in 
Vietnam - A Case-study of the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
Duong Thi Thu 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in Partial Fulfilment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of Master of International Relations (MIR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Victoria University of Wellington 
2013 
i 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
First of all, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to all those who provided 
me with great assistance to complete this research. A special gratitude I would like to give 
many thanks to my Supervisor, Dr. Alexander Bukh, who patiently gave me detailed 
instructions and constructive comments from the very beginning of the writing to the last 
minute of revising. 
Furthermore my heartfelt appreciation goes to the lecturers and staff of Victoria 
University of Wellington and the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, who provided me with a 
wealth of knowledge in International Relations and great assistance during the program. 
A special thank goes to my classmates who shared with me useful information during 
the study. Last but not least, many thanks go to the leaders of VUW and DAV, especially Dr. 
Rob Rabel and Dr. Nguyen Thai Yen Huong, who made every effort to materialize the 
program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... i 
Table of Contents………………………………………….................... .......................... ii 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... v 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. viii 
 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
Background Information ..................................................................................................... 1 
Research Questions ............................................................................................................. 2 
Research Goal ..................................................................................................................... 2 
Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 2 
Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................................... 3 
Gap in Literature Review .................................................................................................... 4 
Structure of the research ..................................................................................................... 5 
Chapter 1. The Theory of Soft Power and Public Diplomacy .......................................... 6 
I./ The Concept of Soft Power in International Relations ................................................... 6 
1. What is Soft Power? ............................................................................................... 6 
2. What Makes Soft Power? ....................................................................................... 9 
3. Soft Power versus Hard Power ............................................................................... 10 
4. The Benefits of Soft Power ..................................................................................... 11 
4.1.Soft Power’s Credibility ................................................................................... 11 
4.2.Soft Power’s Legitimacy .................................................................................. 11 
4.3.Soft Power’s Efficacy ....................................................................................... 12 
5. The Critics of Soft Power ....................................................................................... 12 
II./ The Theory of Public Diplomacy .................................................................................. 14 
1. The Concept of Public Diplomacy .......................................................................... 14 
2. Old Public Diplomacy versus New Public Diplomacy ........................................... 18 
3. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power .......................................................................... 19 
4. Exchanges as a Tool of Public Diplomacy ............................................................. 20 
iii 
 
 
Chapter 2. Japan’s Soft Power and Its Public Diplomacy ............................................ 22 
I./ Japan’s Soft Power ......................................................................................................... 22 
1. Overview of Japan’s Soft Power ............................................................................ 22 
2. What Makes Japan’s Soft Power ............................................................................ 23 
2.1. Japan’s Culture ........................................................................................... 23 
2.2. Japan’s Political Values .............................................................................. 24 
2.3. Japan’s Foreign Policy ................................................................................ 25 
II./ Japan’s Public Diplomacy ............................................................................................. 26 
1. Overview of Japan’s Public Diplomacy  ................................................................ 26 
2. Tools of Japan’s Public Diplomacy ........................................................................ 27 
2.1. Public Relations Abroad ............................................................................. 27 
2.2. Peace-keeping Efforts ................................................................................. 28 
2.3. Cultural Exchange ....................................................................................... 29 
2.4. People-to-people Exchange ........................................................................ 30 
Chapter 3. Japan’s Foreign Policy toward Vietnam ..................................................... 34 
I./ Southeast Asia in Japan’s Foreign Policy ...................................................................... 34 
1. WHY Southeast Asia? ............................................................................................ 34 
2. WHAT Policy ? ...................................................................................................... 36 
II./ Vietnam in Japan’s Foreign Policy ............................................................................... 38 
1. Overview of Vietnam .............................................................................................. 38 
2. Background of Japan – Vietnam Relations ............................................................. 39 
2.1. Early Periods ............................................................................................... 39 
2.2. Before and During Cold War ...................................................................... 40 
2.3. Post Cold War ............................................................................................. 41 
3. Vietnam in Japan’s Foreign Policy: Responding to Wh-questions ........................ 42 
3.1. WHY Vietnam? .......................................................................................... 42 
3.2. WHAT for? ................................................................................................. 43 
3.2.1.1. Economic Interests .................................................................... 43 
3.2.1.2. Political-Security Interests ........................................................ 47 
iv 
 
 
3.3. HOW? ......................................................................................................... 50 
Chapter 4. Japan’s Public Diplomacy in Vietnam and the Case-study of the Ship for 
Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program ................................................................... 54 
I./ Overview of Japan’s Public Diplomacy in Vietnam ...................................................... 54 
1. Public Relations ...................................................................................................... 54 
2. Culture Exchange .................................................................................................... 55 
3. People-to-people Exchange .................................................................................... 57 
3.1. Student Exchange ....................................................................................... 58 
3.2. Youth Exchange .......................................................................................... 59 
3.3. Sports Exchange ......................................................................................... 59 
II./ The Case-study of the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program ................ 60 
1. Overview of the Program ........................................................................................ 60 
1.1. History of Establishment and Development ............................................... 60 
1.2. Participants .................................................................................................. 61 
1.3. Activities ..................................................................................................... 62 
2. Vietnam’s Participation into SSEAYP ................................................................... 63 
3. Description of the Surveys ...................................................................................... 64 
4. Analysis of the Results ........................................................................................... 67 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 79 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................  
Appendixes ........................................................................................................................  
Appendix 1: Questionnaires ................................................................................................  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
No. Name of Figure Page 
1.  Share of exports from ASEAN countries to Japan in 2012 44 
2.  Top 8 largest exporters to Vietnam in 2012 46 
3.  Japan’s ODA disbursement to five countries of Mekong Delta from 
2001-2011 
51 
4.  Which are your favourite comics during your childhood? 57 
5.  Composition of a SSEAYP Contingent 62 
6.  The results for Question 6 “Which aspect of Japan are you most 
impressed with?”  amongst participants? 
68 
7.  The results for Question 6 “Which aspect of Japan are you most 
impressed with?” amongst non-participants? 
68 
8.  The results for Question 1 “Which country has played the most 
important role in the development of Vietnam’s economy?” 
amongst participants. 
69 
9.  The results for Question 1 “Which country has played the most 
important role in the development of Vietnam’s economy?” 
amongst non-participants. 
69 
10.  The results for Question 2 “Which country is the most important 
partner (in both political and economic realm) of Vietnam?” among 
participants. 
70 
11.  The results for Question 2 “Which country is the most important 
partner (in both political and economic realm) of Vietnam?” among 
non-participants 
70 
12.  The results for Question 3 “Which country would you support to be 
a permanent member  of  the  United  Nations  Security  Council?” 
amongst participants 
71 
13.  The results for Question 3 “Which country would you support to be 
a permanent member of  the  United  Nations  Security  Council?” 
amongst non-participants 
71 
14.  The results for Question 4 “Which country deserves to be the 72 
vi 
 
 
regional leader in East Asia?” amongst participants 
15.  The results for Question 4 “Which country deserves to be the 
regional leader in East Asia?” amongst non- participants 
72 
16.  The  results  for  Question  5  “Which  country  would  you  support  
in  the territorial dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands?” amongst 
participants 
73 
17.  The  results  for  Question  5  “Which  country  would  you  support  
in  the territorial dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands?” amongst 
non- participants. 
73 
18.  The results for Question 7 “If there are four foreign companies 
planning to invest in Vietnam on similar conditions, which company 
should be given preference?” amongst participants. 
74 
19.  The results for Question 7 “If there are four foreign companies 
planning to invest in Vietnam on similar conditions, which company 
should be given preference?” amongst non-participants. 
74 
20.  The results for Question 8 “Which country of origin do you prefer 
when purchasing a laptop if the price is the same?” amongst 
participants. 
75 
21.  The results for Question 8 “Which country of origin do you prefer 
when purchasing a laptop if the price is the same?” amongst non-
participants 
75 
22.  The results for Question 9 “If you have your own business, which 
country would you like to export your products to, if the conditions 
offered are the same?” amongst participants 
76 
23.  The results for Question 9 “If you have your own business, which 
country would you like to export your products to, if the conditions 
offered are the same?” amongst non-participants 
76 
24.  The results for Question 10 “If you have to work overseas, which 
country would you opt for?” amongst participants 
77 
25.  The results for Question 10 “If you have to work overseas, which 
country would you opt for?” amongst non- participants 
77 
 
vii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Soft power is a term defined by Nye as the ability to get what you want through 
attraction rather than coercion or payments. Public diplomacy is an instrument that 
government uses to mobilize resources of soft power to attract the public of other countries, 
rather than merely their governments. Both soft power and public diplomacy have been widely 
used in both academic works and the media. However, in Northeast Asia, while much has 
been talked about soft power of a rising China, there is little empirical work on Japan’s soft 
power with a particular case study. Vietnam is a part of Southeast Asia, a strategic location in 
which Japan has a special interest. The research is an attempt to explore dimensions of Japan’s 
soft power and to examine whether public diplomacy is an efficient tool to enhance Japan’s 
soft power in Vietnam. A case study of the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program 
will be used to examine if it can help Japan project its soft power in Vietnam. Two separate 
surveys aiming at the participants of the program and the non-participants are conducted 
simultaneously. The outcomes of the two surveys will reveal whether the participants have 
more positive views about Japan than the non-participants. Moreover, these positive views 
should be correspondent with the foreign policy goals of Japan in its relations with Vietnam. 
Therefore, the surveys can help conclude whether the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth 
Exchange program contributes to the enhancement of Japan’s soft power in Vietnam. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Background Information 
In Northeast Asia, currently with much talk about a rising China, the role of Japan is 
sometimes ignored. After being defeated in World War II, Japan has not focused strictly on 
military ambitions, instead it prioritized economic growth. Despite enormous difficulties 
including severe destruction after the historic bombing and the country‟s lack of natural 
resources, with appropriate strategies and policies, Japan has constituted impressive economic 
achievements. The country had once captured significant attention from the outside world in 
the mid-1980s with a vibrant wave of its foreign direct investment in the East Asian region. 
Nowadays, Japan is the world third largest economy (after the United States and China) and 
the second largest developed economy (second to the United States). Apart from economic 
might, Japan is also well-known for its unique and diverse culture. There is no more vivid 
illustration for the obvious attraction of Japan by the following facts and figures. According to 
the Country Brand Index (CBI), a prominent global study of country brands
1
, Japan is now 
ranked the third in the Top 25 Country Brands. Moreover, the BBC Global Poll, which 
measured perceptions of different countries‟ influence in the world, has revealed that Japan 
topped the ranking during the 2011-2012 period
2
. 
Vietnam is a part of Southeast Asia in which Japan has a special interest
3
. The country is 
considered by some as one of the major powers in Southeast Asia with a huge population of 
about 90 million and as an emerging economy. Bordering with China, which has a prolonged 
territorial dispute with Japan, Vietnam lies in a strategic position to Japan‟s foreign policy. 
Moreover, Southeast Asia is also a strategic region because Japan is dependent on the region 
for importing natural resources and exporting its products. The country also definitely needs 
support from ten ASEAN countries for its quest for a permanent seat in the United Nations 
                                                 
1
 The basic elements of a country brand's strength include Value System (Political system, environmental 
friendliness, stable and legal environment, tolerance, freedom of speech); Quality of life (education system, 
healthcare system, standard of living, job opportunity and most like to live in); Good for business (investment 
climate, advanced technology, regulatory environment, skilled workforce); Heritage and Culture (History, art 
and culture, authenticity, natural beauty) and Tourism (Value for money, Attractions, resorts and lodging 
options, food). (see www.futurebrand.com)  
2
 Japan is seen as having the most positive influence in the world among all countries evaluated, and views have 
improved slightly since 2011. On average, in the 21 tracking countries surveyed, 58 per cent of respondents hold 
positive views of Japan‟s influence (up from 56% in 2011), and 21 per cent hold negative views (up 1 point from 
2011). (see www.japanprobe.com)  
3
 Shiraisi, Japanese Relations with Vietnam: 1951-1987, p1 
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Security Council. And it is apparent that if the ASEAN community appreciate Japan‟s values, 
the country can gain higher recognition as well as improve its international image. In addition, 
facing a rising China and its increasing influence in South East Asia, it is a good option for 
Japan to gain the support of Southeast Asian countries including Vietnam. 
The above analyses mean that there is much to talk about Japan‟s power (both hard 
and soft power) and about the importance of strengthening its relations with Southeast Asian 
countries. With regard to soft power, while much has been discussed about that of the United 
States and China, there is not enough empirical work on Japan‟s soft power. Moreover, 
although Japan has lagged behind China in terms of economic strength, it is still a strong 
economic power and may embrace a great deal of soft power. Therefore, a careful 
examination of Japan‟s soft power is essential to accurately measure the country‟s 
capabilities. This research will attempt to analyze resources of Japan‟s soft power in general 
and public diplomacy in particular and examine whether youth exchange programs as an 
example of Japan‟s public diplomacy can help this country project its soft power in Vietnam. 
In this connection, the following research question will be addressed: 
Research questions: 
Is public diplomacy an effective tool to enhance Japan’s soft power in Vietnam? 
In order to support the research question, the dissertation will attempt to address the 
following sub-question: 
Do youth exchange programs as a tool of Japan’s public diplomacy help enhance 
Japan’s soft power in Vietnam? 
Research Goal 
The main goal of this research is to examine whether public diplomacy in general and 
youth exchange programs has been efficient in enhancing Japan‟s soft power in Vietnam. If 
such program helps increase the positive views on Japan by Vietnamese people, Japan should 
invest more in such activities.  
Methodology 
Materials used in the dissertation will be used from both primary and secondary 
sources. Primary sources include documents such as speeches of leaders, documents issued by 
Japanese government and related ministries and authorities; and secondary sources include 
3 
 
 
 
books, research works, articles and manuscript from the internet, etc…on the issues related to 
the dissertation. 
In the research, inductive method will be applied. Induction is the method which 
moves from the particular to the general. It gathers together particular observations in the 
form of premises, then it reasons from these particular premises to a general conclusion. It is 
contrary to deductive method which moves from the general to the particular. It takes a 
general premise and deduces particular conclusions
4
.  
In Nye‟s analysis, “Soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move 
people by argument. In terms of behavior, soft power is attractive power. In terms of 
resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction. Whether a 
particular asset is a soft power resource that produces attraction can be measured by 
asking people through polls or focus groups”.  
To illustrate the significance of public diplomacy in enhancing Japan‟s soft power 
resources, two surveys aiming at non-participants and participants (focus groups) in an 
exchange program hosted by Japan will be conducted. The survey will be in questionnaire 
form. One survey will cover Vietnamese participating youths (members) who participated in 
the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program (SSEAYP) in different years. The 
other survey will examine Vietnamese people who have never joined any exchange programs 
hosted by Japan and have no personal linkage with this country. Data collected from these 
surveys (particular premises) will be analyzed to a general conclusion if youth exchange 
program is an efficient way for Japan to enhance its soft power. 
Theoretical framework 
Regarding the measurement of state capabilities, realism, one of the most powerful IR 
theories sometimes cannot fully explain the nature of power while merely focusing on hard 
power. To realists, power is based on the material capabilities that a state controls. These 
capabilities include tangible military assets and socio-economic ingredients that go into 
building military power (which is called latent power). Latent power is based on a state‟s 
wealth and the size of its overall population
5
. At the first glance, this view of power may be 
appropriate, especially with examples of great powers like the United States or China which 
have both huge military assets and latent power. However, empirical evidence has shown that 
power is not that simple. It is not enough to look at a state‟s military, wealth or population. It 
                                                 
4
 Harvey Bluedorn, „Two Methods of Reasoning‟ 
5
 Mearsheimer, „Structural Realism‟, pp78-92 
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is sometimes how its identities are constructed by its government, people and other countries 
that matters more. That is constructivism. Constructivists emphasize the role of ideas, of 
shared knowledge of the social world. To illustrate how constructivism works in IR studies, 
take Great Britain and North Korea, for example. 10 nuclear weapons of North Korea is much 
less challenging than 250 nuclear weapons of Great Britain. A realist with strong emphasis on 
hard power would think that Great Britain is a far greater threat than North Korea in the 
international system
6. However, a “shared knowledge” of the social world will reveal the 
opposite thing. Great Britain is considered to be a friendly power; whereas North Korea is 
often thought to be extremely aggressive. Therefore, while realism sometimes cannot explain 
a certain issue in the international relations, especially with regard to state power, 
constructivism help fulfill the gap. Nye‟s conception of soft power was designed to remedy 
the narrow focus of realist power analysis („the ability to change what others do‟) by bringing 
in the power of attraction („the ability to shape what others want‟). In fact, soft power is not 
an alternative to hard power; it complements that of realism. A proposed by Nye, soft power 
derives from three sources: culture, political values and foreign policy. Therefore, 
constructivism is the right theory to explain soft power in this dissertation.  
Gap in Literature review 
Concerning the empirical works on soft power and public diplomacy, much has been 
written about soft power and public diplomacy of great powers, especially the United States 
and China and even middle powers such as South Korea or Canada. In East Asia, China has 
recently emerged as a great power in both hard (surpassing Japan as the world‟s second 
largest economy) and soft term (with powerful mechanisms to boost soft power such as the 
notion of peaceful rise and then peaceful development). As a result, a variety of works have 
concentrated on discussing and evaluating China‟s soft power. Mellisen and Lee noted that 
“soft power and public diplomacy are now household terms that are frequently used in 
discussion about international relations”7 in this region. However, it seems that Japan has not 
been sufficiently discussed. Many of works are generally discussed about Japan‟s soft power. 
Particularly, there is little research investigating Japan‟s public diplomacy. And there is not 
much empirical work on Japan‟s soft power and public diplomacy with a particular case 
                                                 
6
 Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations, p.238 
7
 Lee and Mellisen, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia 
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study. Therefore, this thesis is an attempt to explore dimensions of Japan‟s soft power and 
public diplomacy with a case-study of Vietnam and the effect of the Ship for Southeast Asian 
Youth Exchange Program on enhancing Japan‟s soft power in Vietnam.  
Research Structure 
The research is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1 introduces an overview of soft power and public diplomacy, the theoretical 
framework of the research. It analyses derivations of soft power and the relationship between 
soft power and public diplomacy. 
 Chapter 2 aims at providing an analysis of Japan‟s soft power and its public 
diplomacy. A detailed discussion of public diplomacy in Japan will be initiated to examine 
whether Japan‟s public diplomacy is an effective tool to enhance its soft power or not. 
Chapter 3 analyses Japan‟s foreign policy toward Vietnam with a detailed insight in 
Japan‟s national interests in Vietnam. 
Chapter 4 is used to analyze Japan‟s public diplomacy in Vietnam and describe two 
surveys to examine the effectiveness of youth exchange programs (SSEAYP is an example) in 
enhancing Japan‟s soft power. Youth exchange programs have been used as a tool of Japan‟s 
public diplomacy. A comparison between the results of these two surveys will reveal whether 
youth exchange programs in general and SSEAYP in particular have contributed to the 
projection of Japan‟s soft power in Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE THEORY OF SOFT POWER  
AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
 
I. THE CONCEPT OF SOFT POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
1. What is Soft Power 
According to different theories, states are considered to be highly important actors in 
international relations. For example, realists argue that states are the major actors in world 
affairs; neo-liberal institutionalists believe that international institutions as well as states are 
key players in world politics. Therefore, political scientists have been studying various 
aspects of states, and power is one of the principal focuses. Power is defined as how one state 
uses its material resources to compel another state to do something it does not want to
8
. 
Especially, power can be considered as the exclusive realm of realism, one of the most 
powerful political theories. Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and indeed all classical realists 
believe that the goal of power, the means of power and the uses of power are a central 
preoccupation of political activity
9
.  
In this definition, there are only material forms of power which encompass military 
and economic capacity. However, there are also other scholars who have developed different 
views on power. Susan Strange defined that power embraces both structural and relational 
dimension. Structural power is the capability to create rules, norms, and modes of operation 
for various dimensions of the international system
10
. Relational power is the power of A to get 
B to do something they would not otherwise do”11. Hannah Arendt maintained that power in 
social relations result from the human ability to act to persuade or coerce others
12
. Lukes in 
Power: A Radical View argued that power is seen as the imposition of internal constrains, and 
those subject to it acquire beliefs that result in their consent or their adaption to domination by 
either coercive or non-coercive forms
13
.  
                                                 
8
 Barnett and Duvall, „Power in International Politics‟, p.22 
9
 Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations, p.68 
10
 Volgy et al, „Structural versus Relational Strength: The Cohesion of the G7 and the Development of the Post-
Cold War International System‟ 
11
 ibid 
12
 Hutcheon, „Hannah Arendt on the Concept of Power‟ 
13
 Lozenri, „Power: A Radical View by Stephen Lukes”, pp.87-95 
http://www.webasa.org/Pubblicazioni/Lorenzi_2006_2.pdf 
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Joseph S. Nye may well have shared these views when he coined the term “soft 
power” which defined the non-material and non-coercive form of power. According to Nye, 
measuring state capabilities does not merely base on such “tangible assets” as size of 
population or military and economic strength. Instead, it requires a more comprehensive 
understanding of power, questioning the relevance of “conventional” power. This gives rise to 
the development of a new concept of power as well as the taxonomy with hard power and soft 
power. Hard power is mainly composed of military and economic capabilities; and soft power 
encompasses the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or 
payments.  
To date, there has been no generally accepted definition of soft power; and even 
Joseph Nye, the „father” of this term, has produced different “versions” of what soft power 
means. For example, in the very first book about soft power, “Bound to Lead” in 1990, Nye 
defined soft power as “getting others want the outcomes you want – co-opts people rather 
than coerces them”. And in his best-selling book Soft Power - The Means to Success in World 
Politics in 2004, Nye developed the concept more fully to “a state‟s ability to attract others to 
a set of “shared values and justness and duty of contributing to those values”14.  And also in 
this book, he called soft power the second face of power. “Countries can sometimes obtain the 
outcomes they want without tangible threats or payoffs. This indirect method has sometimes 
been called “the second face of power” or soft power”.15 
Apart from Nye, IR scholars around the world have widely discussed and developed 
different understandings of soft power. Steven Lukes in “Power and the battle for hearts and 
minds” suggested that Nye‟s conception of soft power “might seem to be a cousin” of what he 
                                                 
14
 Walt, „The Downside of Soft Power‟ 
15
 Nye, Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics 
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called “power‟s third dimension16: the power to shape, influence or determine others‟ beliefs 
and desires, thereby securing their compliance
17
. 
Participants to the Soft power workshop held at the Johns Hopkins University in 2008 
created the following perceptions about soft power: 
“Non-kinetic power of persuasion, even the power to seduce” 
“Non-military means for achieving particular foreign policy objectives” 
“Getting others to want the same things you do, and thus making your aims 
legitimate” 
“The ability of international actors to advance their foreign policy interests through the 
attractiveness of their culture and values rather than through force or economic leverage” 
“Modifying behavior or attitudes across wide functional distances”18  
And most recently, Alexei Pilko, a senior research fellow at Moscow Lomonosov 
State University described “soft power” as the attractiveness of a country‟s international 
image. A country‟s image is a set of integral parts, such as their value system, political 
system, economic order, culture, traditions and customs, historical heritage, ideology, 
religion, etc
19
.  
All in all, the concept of soft power has been viewed differently and therefore, there 
are various definitions of soft power as mentioned above. However, similarities among these 
definitions can be summarized in the following words: non-material, tangible, indirect, 
attraction, persuasion, acceptance and influence. The very first and “primitive” definition of 
soft power (the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or 
payments) will be used as a base in this dissertation most because the ability to attract is a 
very important element of public diplomacy in general and youth exchange programs in 
particular. 
                                                 
16
 According to Lukes, power is a multi-dimensional social factor. The one-dimensional view of power focuses 
on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable (overt) conflict of 
(subjective) interests, seen as expressing policy preferences, revealed by political participation. The two-
dimensional view of power focuses on decision-making and control over the political agenda on issues and 
potential issues over which there is an observable (overt and covert) conflict of subjective interests, seen as 
preferences or grievances. The three-dimensional view of power proposed by Lukes focuses on decision-making 
and control over the political agenda (not necessarily through decisions) on issues and potential issues over 
which there is an observable (overt and covert) and latent conflict of subjective and real interests (see Lozenri, 
„Power: A Radical View by Steven Lukes‟) 
17
 Lukes, „Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds‟, p.447 
18
 Deane et al, „Soft power Workshop‟ 
19
 Pilko, „What is soft power and how should Russia use it? „ 
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2. What Makes Soft Power? 
Nye pointed out three major instruments of soft power for a country: “Culture, values, 
and foreign policies”20. “Culture is the set of values and practices that create meaning for a 
country”. There are two categories of culture: high culture and popular culture. Philosopher 
Roger Scruton defined high culture as the “self-consciousness of a society”21 or “a tradition in 
which objects made for aesthetic contemplation renew through their allusive power the 
experience of membership”22. High culture comprises the works of art, literature, scholarship 
and philosophy that are usually for educated people. Popular culture (or pop culture for short) 
is popular, easy to understand and entertaining to the majority of young people. Examples of 
pop culture may be pop music, comics, films or reality TV shows.  High culture is more so 
sophisticated than pop culture. While high culture is usually for intellectual experience; pop 
culture is often for entertainment. 
According to Nye, it is more probable for a country to expand its soft power when its 
culture includes “universal values” and its policies “promote interests that others share”23. As 
an illustration, the traditional Chinese cultural values with “harmony between nature and 
human kind” and “giving priority to human beings” seems more appealing, putting Chinese 
culture in a more advantageous position
24
 than that of many others. Young Nam Cho and Jong 
Ho emphasize that together with the economic miracle, the spreading of Chinese values and 
culture to the outside world has enabled China to become a potential competitor to the United 
States in the Asian region. They argue that China‟s recognition of soft power and its 
application to national policies is an important factor in explaining the country‟s rapidly 
improving image and increasing influence in Asia, along with rapid economic growth and 
military power
25
. 
Furthermore, a country‟s foreign policies can be an important instrument of its soft 
power. For example, “China‟s foreign policy has attempted to reassure others of its 
nonthreatening intent, enhance acceptance by the international community, and proactively 
                                                 
20
 Nye, „Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics‟ 
21
 Jones, „High culture versus pop culture: which is best for engaging students?‟ 
22„Roger Scruton: Can High Culture be a Substitute for Religion?‟ 
23
 Nye, „Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics‟ 
24
 Li, Soft power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics 
25
 Cho and Jeong, „China‟s soft power: Discussions, Resources and Prospects‟, pp. 453-472 
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realign the international environment to its liking”26. However, domestic or foreign policies 
which are not supported or bring about negative effects can easily undermine soft power
27
. 
The classical example for the failure of the American foreign policy which revealed a steep 
decline in the US soft power was the war in Iraq in 2003.  
A country‟s values (for example, democracy or freedom) are also an important source 
of its soft power.  For instance, “American liberal democracy as an ideology is a strong source 
of US soft power because it is very appealing to many social-political elites throughout the 
world”28.  Another example is the Beijing Consensus, the Chinese model of development. It 
can be an effective source of China‟s soft power as it has been accepted and followed by 
many third-world countries
29. And according to James F. Paradise, “the Chinese government 
is attempting to project a more favorable image of the country and reassure the world that its 
intentions are benign. The Confucius Institute project…is part of a broader soft power 
projection in which China is attempting to win hearts and minds for political purposes”30. 
Therefore, by projecting attractive culture, political values and foreign policies, states 
can maximize their soft power as well as their power in general. 
3. Soft Power versus Hard Power 
Hard power is closely related to command power. Nye defined command power as 
“the ability to change what others do” and it “can rest on coercion or inducement”. Hard 
power strategies include forces, sanctions, payments and bribes. For example, the terrorist 
attack on September 11, 2001 was a perfect example of using hard power. Classical and neo-
realists have mainly focused on military and economic might - hard power to measure state 
capabilities. 
Soft power can be referred to co-optive power. It is the ability to shape the preferences 
of others. Instead of using coercion, soft power embraces attraction and influence instead. 
Therefore, soft power can be called “attractive power” or the power of attraction. It is an 
important source of power. On the one hand, soft power is needed to obtain hard power. On 
the other hand, it is easier to project soft power than hard power.   
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All kinds of power are crucially significant when measuring the capabilities of states. 
Hard power is more “visible” in defining state strength. It is also very significant during war 
time and in the protection of state sovereignty. However, countries have been so aware of the 
horrors of war that they tend to avoid being involved.  Therefore, nowadays, on the one hand 
states are seeking to strengthen its hard power to some extent; on the other hand, they are 
putting more emphasis on projecting soft power because of enormous benefits this power 
confers. 
4. The Benefits of Soft Power 
Soft power has many benefits; and the most prominent of which can be summarized in 
3Ys: Credibility, Legitimacy and Efficacy 
4.1. Soft Power’s Credibility 
“Credibility is the crucial resource and an important source of soft power. Reputation 
becomes even more important than in the past, and political struggles occur over the creation 
and destruction of credibility”31. In the world of technology and information today, people can 
easily get access to information every time and everywhere. Therefore, the diffusion of 
culture as well as political values and policies, the fundamental instruments of soft power, has 
been assisted efficiently. As soft power is the ability to shape the preferences of others, it 
should establish credibility to attract or to persuade. With the paradox of plenty
32
, it is hard to 
define which information is right or wrong. Therefore, credibility becomes the foremost 
attraction of soft power.  
4.2. Soft Power’s Legitimacy 
Legitimacy can be defined as a value whereby something or someone is recognized 
and accepted as right and proper
33
. In the case of states, internationally, legitimacy means that 
state values are accepted and may be followed by others, not because states wield coercive 
force, but because their values are attractive and persuasive. It can be said that soft power is 
basically about legitimacy. “Legitimacy is central to soft power. If a people or nation believes 
American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead 
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without using threats or bribes”34. Therefore, it is undeniable that, with the ability to attract 
and persuade, soft power can help increase state legitimacy. For example, as the US policies 
and values have been widely recognized and accepted, the United States‟ soft power is also on 
a par with its military and economic capabilities. Another example put by Nye was that some 
radical Muslim fundamentalists may have been willing to support Osama bin Laden not 
because of payments or threats, but because they believed in the legitimacy of his 
objectives
35
. 
4.3. Soft Power’s Efficacy 
As soft power is described as the ability to shape the preferences of others by 
attracting or persuading, it does not involve forces or compulsion like military or economic 
means. Therefore, in comparison to hard power strategies, states can save a huge amount of 
financial resources with soft power. Moreover, according to Nye “soft power resources are the 
assets that produce attraction which often leads to acquiescence; seduction is always more 
effective than coercion”. Armitage and Nye also claimed that with the attribute of legitimacy, 
soft power can help reduce the cost of using hard power when the situation demands. 
Moreover, “if you can get others to be attracted, to want what you want, it costs you much 
less in carrots and sticks”36. As an illustration, with its well-established civilization, no one 
can deny the profound influence of China in the cultures of its neighboring countries such as 
Japan, Korea or Vietnam. The process of cultural assimilation could be stimulated naturally 
due to the attractiveness of various China‟s values such as Confucianism or Chinese literature.  
5.  The Critics of Soft Power 
Few could argue about the popularity of the concept of soft power in policy papers, 
academics works and the media. To illustrate, Google will produce 212 million results for the 
key words “US soft power” in just 0.27 seconds, about 33 million for “Chinese soft power” 
and nearly 100 million for “UK soft power” in a similar period of time. However, it does not 
means the concept of soft power is accepted everywhere. Some claim that it is a rather 
ineffective and vague concept. Some argue that it is just a reflection of hard power. Therefore, 
only states with a powerful military and economic capability can possess a great deal of soft 
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power. Others think that it is difficult to measure soft power because it embraces intangible 
assets like influence, reputation or prestige
37
. And Nye, the father of the concept also 
acknowledges several limits of soft power. He noted that soft power depends more on context 
than hard power. In other words, it relies largely on the existence of willing interpreters and 
receivers
38
. More specifically, columnist Etyen Mahcupyan shared a similar view with Nye in 
maintaining that “the precondition for the effectiveness of soft power with respect to other 
nations depends on the development of these nations in terms of democracy”39. For example, 
Hollywood movies are popular around the world; however, they are not accepted by societies 
which consider violence or sexuality as a taboo
40
. In this case, Hollywood movies serve as a 
damaging factor in establishing the US soft power in those societies. 
Moreover, according to Stephen Walt, soft power seems to be an epiphenomenon 
because hard power is needed to produce much of the soft variety”41. However, the close link 
between hard and soft power is still being questioned. On the one hand, great power does not 
necessarily mean great soft power and the other way round. For example, neither Canada nor 
Switzerland is a great power; but both have a huge source of soft power.  On the other hand, 
great powers with strong hard power including the United States, China or Japan often acquire 
a great deal of soft power. For example, the United States has long been accepted as a 
superpower, the only predominant actor in the global affairs. It is undeniable that in terms of 
hard power, the United States is second to none (it has always been by far the world largest 
military spender; and economically, it accounts for about one quarter of the global output). 
Furthermore, with regard to soft power, according to Nye, the United States has been 
attractive to the rest of the world, due to its political values, democratic institutions and 
popular culture. As a result, Washington is able to achieve some of its foreign policy goals, 
without necessary resorting to coercion, threats and bribery.  
As Hayden put it, soft power‟s currency is most readily observable in the spread of 
public diplomacy and similar policies
42
. Therefore, a close relationship between public 
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diplomacy and soft power is obviously visible; and it is worth examining how public 
diplomacy works in international relations. 
II. THE THEORY OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
1. The Concept of Public Diplomacy 
         There has been a wide range of definitions for diplomacy. Generically, diplomacy is 
called an art, a science, a craft, a process, a practice, a function, and an institution
43
 or simply 
“the art of conducting relations between civilized nations”44. Academically, diplomacy has 
been defined as “a political process by which political entities conduct official relations with 
one another in the international environment”45. Christopher Hill emphasized on the manner 
and the purpose of diplomacy in maintaining that diplomacy is the human face of getting your 
own way in international politics, as well as a crucial instrument for building international 
stability
46
. Malone pointed out a different purpose of public diplomacy when he defined it as 
the direct communication with foreign peoples with the aim of affecting their thinking and 
ultimately that of their governments
47
. With regard to functions, diplomacy “encompasses the 
making and implementing of foreign policy; the  traditional  functions  of representation,  
reporting,  communicating,  negotiating, and  maneuvering, as  well  as caring for  the  
interests  of  nationals  abroad."
48
 The role of diplomacy in international relations as well as in 
domestic levels is crucial as it is an important independent variable
49
 of peace and conflict. As 
G.R. Berridge analyzed, the principal purpose of diplomacy is “to enable states to secure the 
objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or law”50. Melissen 
suggested that the main purpose of diplomacy is “resolving international difficulties 
peacefully
51.” In other words, “diplomacy is an important means by which states pursue their 
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foreign policies”52. The famous saying by Adolf Hitler that “When diplomacy ends, war 
begins” highlights the importance of diplomacy in deterring conflicts. 
           There are many ways to categorize diplomacy which is based on purpose, manner, 
function, field, etc. Cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy, shuttle diplomacy, preventive 
diplomacy, to name a few, are some types of diplomacy. Among these, the rise of public 
diplomacy has been “an important new dimension of the domestic environment in recent 
decades”.53 
           The term „public diplomacy‟ was coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion with the 
following definition “Public diplomacy… deals with the influence of public attitudes on the 
formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international 
relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in 
other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the 
reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job 
is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural 
communications”54. Since then, scholars and practitioners have developed increasingly 
sufficient and thorough understandings of public diplomacy. Malone did not point out actors 
of public diplomacy when he described public diplomacy as “direct communication with 
foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and ultimately, that of their 
governments”55 Hans Tuch went a further step with “public diplomacy is a government's 
process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for 
its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and 
policies."
56
 Signitzer and Coombs defined public diplomacy as "the way in which both 
government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public 
attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government's foreign policy 
decisions"
57. And according to Nye, “public diplomacy is an instrument that government uses 
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to mobilize resources of soft power to communicate with and attract the public of other 
countries, rather than merely their governments”58.   
Diplomacy of a nation, basing on actors and receivers, can be categorized into 
different types or branches. State diplomacy, which can be referred to “traditional diplomacy” 
aims at maintaining and improving relations between a country and others. Party diplomacy 
refers to the establishment and enhancement of relations between a nation‟s party and parties 
of other countries. Public diplomacy deals with relations among governments, organizations 
and individuals of different countries to better serve a nation‟s policy. Public diplomacy can 
also be called people‟s diplomacy or people-to-people diplomacy in some countries. It is 
difficult to define which diplomacy (public, state or other kinds of diplomacy) is the most 
effective. However, it can be said that public diplomacy not only supplements other kinds of 
diplomacy but also surpasses them in a certain case. To illustrate, during the meeting with 
leaders of the Vietnam – Cambodia Friendship Association in 2011, Prime Minister of 
Cambodia Hun Sen noted that people-to-people diplomacy (or public diplomacy) is like a 
“bamboo bridge”, which is easier to build than a “cement bridge” (which implies state 
diplomacy). Therefore, there are cases when state diplomacy does not work and public 
diplomacy has to give a hand
59
. Realizing the important role of public diplomacy, many 
countries have established special governmental agencies in charge of promoting these 
relations. For example, there are the Chinese People‟s Association for Friendship with 
Foreign Countries in China, the All India Peace and Solidarity Organization in India and the 
Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations in Vietnam. 
         The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office defined five components of public 
diplomacy including listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and 
international broadcasting
60. “Listening is an actor‟s attempt to manage the international 
environment by collecting and collating data  about publics and their opinions overseas  and 
using that  data  to  redirect  its policy or  its  wider public  diplomacy approach  accordingly”. 
Listening, as pointed out by Cull, “precedes all successful public diplomacy61” Listening in 
public diplomacy may be included in talks by state leaders with foreign publics during their 
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official visits. “Advocacy in public diplomacy is an actor's attempt to manage the 
international environment by undertaking an international communication activity to actively 
promote a particular policy, idea, or that actor's general interests in the minds of a foreign 
public”. Embassy press relations can be one form of advocacy diplomacy. “Cultural 
diplomacy is an actor's attempt to manage the international environment through making its 
cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission 
abroad”. “Exchange  diplomacy is  an  actor's attempt to manage the  international  
environment by  sending its  citizens  overseas  and reciprocally  accepting citizens  from 
overseas  for  a period of study and/or acculturation”. “Efforts like organizing an eleven-
nation performance tour entitled “Voyage of Chinese Culture to Africa”62 can be categorized 
as exchange diplomacy. International broadcasting is an actor‟s attempt to manage the 
international environment by using the technologies of radio, television and the internet to 
engage with foreign public
63
. International broadcasting has long been at the heart of major 
nations‟ public diplomacy strategies as one of the most effective ways to reach international 
publics”.64 Examples of international broadcasting are quite many, VOA, CNN or BBC, to 
mention a few. 
Nye identified three dimensions of public diplomacy. The first and most immediate 
dimension is daily communications, which involves explaining the context of domestic and 
foreign policy decisions. The second is strategic communication, which develops a set of 
simple themes much as a political or advertising campaign does. The third is the development 
of lasting relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, 
exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels.
65
  
Public diplomacy is usually equated or even used interchangeably with several related 
concepts including (international) public relations and propagranda. For example, “Signitzer 
and Coombs even argued that public diplomacy and public relations are very similar and 
called for conceptual convergence of the two. Wang suggested that managing national 
reputation is a key concept in public diplomacy”66. 
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However, in fact, basing on such categories as purpose and manner, a clear-cut 
separation among these concepts is clearly seen. Public diplomacy tries to draw attention and 
understanding of foreign publics for its nation‟s culture, values and policies through 
broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arrange exchanges, and so forth
67
. Public relations 
is an effort to establish mutually beneficial relations with the public of other nations. And 
propaganda, according to Welch, is “the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an 
audience through the transmission of ideas and values for the specific purpose, consciously 
designed to serve the interest of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or 
indirectly”68. Put it another way, propaganda is merely to inform foreign peoples of a nation‟s 
policies. Therefore, while there may be certain convergence among these notions, public 
diplomacy, public relations and propaganda are totally different in their respective purpose 
which can be summarized in three following words: understanding, linking and informing. 
After all, apart from additional contents, public diplomacy includes the functions of both 
public relations and propaganda. “Conveying information and selling a positive image is part 
of it, but public diplomacy also involves building long-term relationships that create an 
enabling environment for government policies”69. With its crucial functions as analyzed 
above, the significance of public diplomacy has been increasingly appreciated. For instance, 
Jan Mellisen noted that public diplomacy has already become the bread and butter of many 
diplomats‟ work. In Europe, public diplomacy has also become a staple commodity in 
international affairs.
70
 The significance of public diplomacy was also acknowledged by Lee 
and Mellisen when they maintained that practitioners increasingly categorize public 
diplomacy as one of the core functions of diplomacy today, and sometimes even the most 
important
71
.  
2. Old Public Diplomacy versus New Public Diplomacy 
Public diplomacy was traditionally considered as “the transparent means by which a 
sovereign country communicates with publics in other countries aimed at informing and 
influencing audiences overseas for the purpose of promoting the national interest and 
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advancing its foreign policy goals”72. By this definition, it is apparent that public diplomacy is 
not totally separated from state diplomacy with states as principal actors. The concept of new 
public diplomacy has included additional actors of public diplomacy (both state and non-state 
actors). Moreover, thanks to technological advancements (especially the internet and mobile 
phones), the new public diplomacy has benefited greatly from a modern technological 
environment. As a result, the separation between domestic and international news spheres has 
disappeared in new public diplomacy. While “old” public diplomacy relied on the concept of 
advocacy and propaganda, the “new” one aims at branding and network. Furthermore, the 
new public diplomacy has concentrated on building soft power and nation brand instead of 
merely prestige and international image
73.  Gilboa suggested that the term “new public 
diplomacy” represents an attempt to adjust public diplomacy to the conditions of the 
information age
74
.  
In short, the major difference between “old” diplomacy and new public diplomacy is 
that old public diplomacy deals with relationships between the representatives of states, or 
other international actors; whereas new public diplomacy includes both state and non-state 
actors
75”. The concept of public diplomacy used in this dissertation will be implied as the new 
public diplomacy. 
3. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power 
While soft power is often cited as an ambiguous concept, public diplomacy “seems to 
be a somewhat easier concept to grasp because of its inherently practice, hands-on qualities 
and the fact that it can be framed in the context of wider diplomatic practice”76. The close 
relationship between public diplomacy and soft power is quite clear. According to Melissen, 
“public diplomacy means yielding soft power” and “public diplomacy is one of soft power‟s 
key instruments”77. Concerning the United States, Peter van Ham suggested that “public 
diplomacy is an essential tool to win over the hearts and minds of foreign audiences, and to 
convince them that their values, goals and desires are similar to those of the US. []. In an 
effort to touch ordinary citizens of Muslim countries, public diplomacy is considered crucial 
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to exercise the US‟s ample soft power”78. Gilboa was more specific in explaining that public 
diplomacy is presented as an official policy translating soft power resources into action. Put it 
another way, public diplomacy is a means while soft power is an end. Nicolas Cull examined 
the relationship between public diplomacy and soft power in a different way. He argued that 
public diplomacy can be the mechanism to deploy soft power
79
; however, it does not mean 
that public diplomacy and soft power always go together. Sometimes public diplomacy can be 
conducted without any soft power; and vice versa, a country may have soft power with little 
resort to public diplomacy.  
Nye pointed out, “public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these 
potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, 
and so forth”80. Therefore, it can be understood that public diplomacy in its various tools can 
help promote a nation‟s soft power. Bigger powers such as the United States, China and Japan 
see a greater need to incorporate soft power in their public diplomacy toward the region (East 
Asia)
81
.  However, it is a must that the resources used in public diplomacy (which may be 
culture, values, policies or institutions) should be attractive to foreign publics; otherwise 
public diplomacy cannot fulfill its task.  
4. Exchanges as a Tool of Public Diplomacy 
As mentioned earlier, exchange is one of the five components of public diplomacy 
(the others include listening, advocacy, cultural and international broadcasting). Moreover, 
according to Nye, “effective public diplomacy is a two-way street that involves listening as 
well as talking. We need to understand better what is going on in the minds of others and what 
values we share”82. Nye also cited that “the development of lasting relationships with key 
individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, 
and access to media channel”83 is one dimension of public diplomacy. Therefore, it is 
apparent that exchanges serve as a tool of public diplomacy. 
Exchange programs, as mentioned above, are a part of public diplomacy activities. In 
comparison the other components of public diplomacy, exchange diplomacy seems to target 
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individuals instead of the mass public
84
. As a result, exchanges will exert more impacts on 
participants with than the non-participants. With their personal experience developed during 
and after participating in exchange activities, participants can have either positive or negative 
views about the host country. The country which holds exchange programs expects that 
participants will hold a more positive view about its country. These participants, who may 
become important leaders in the future, will be more inclined to support the host country‟s 
policies. In this case, it can be said that exchanges as a part of public diplomacy contribute to 
the enhancement of its soft power.  
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CHAPTER 2: JAPAN’S SOFT POWER AND ITS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
I.  JAPAN’S SOFT POWER 
1. Overview of Japan’s soft power 
According to Yasushi and McConnell, Japan was the first country in East Asia to 
embrace the concept of soft power as an instrument of its foreign affairs and security policy, 
particularly because of its constitutional constraints on the use of military hard power
85
. Nye 
asserted that Japan has more potential soft power resources than any other Asian countries 
and is the first non-Western countries, which has the same level of income and technology as 
the Western countries, while keeps its unique culture
86
. These statements can be effectively 
supported by the following facts and figures.  According to annual surveys by the Monocle 
Magazine, Japan has always been listed in of Top 10 nations with soft power (ranked 7
th
 in 
2012
87
) and currently Japan acquires  one of the leading positions in terms of nation branding 
(ranked 3
rd
 in the 2012-2013 Top 25 Country Brands)
88
. 
However, Japan still faces a number of obstacles in maintaining and enhancing its soft 
power. First of all, because of constitutional restriction (as stated in Article 9 in Japan‟s 
constitution which prohibits Japan to wage war), Japan has no other option than resorting to 
the expansion of its soft power. Therefore, as noted by Utpal Vyas, Japan is experienced in 
using softer forms of power due to externally imposed constitutional restrictions on its use of 
military force in international affairs
89
. Simply put, while hard power is restricted, soft power 
plays a crucial role in Japan‟s national power. However, according to Lam, there are several 
limits of Japan‟s soft power including historical constraints, lack of CNN or BBC-like 
institution or its unpopular language
90
. Historical constraints include historical issues during 
the previous war (the well-known case is wartime comfort women mainly from the 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, China and Taiwan) and recent disputes (for example, the visit 
of Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine or the history textbook). Another limit of 
Japan‟s soft power is that the country is still distrusted by many East Asian states and 
involved in territorial and resources disputes with China and South Korea over the Senkaku 
                                                 
85
 Yasushi and McConnell, Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United 
States  
86
  Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics  
87
 „Top Ten Nations with Soft Power‟ 
88„Country Brand Index 2012-2013‟, p.4 
89
 Vyas, „Japan Foundation in China: An Agent of Japan soft power?‟ 
90
 Lam, „Japan‟s Quest for “Soft Power”: Attraction and Limitation‟, p.358. 
23 
 
 
 
(Diaoyu in Chinese) and Takeshima (Tok-do in Korean) islands respectively
91
. Therefore, 
while the factors like the establishment of universal institutions or the popularization of 
Japanese language to the world take time or seem to be difficult, there is an urgent need for 
Japan to settle historical issues with its neighboring countries; otherwise, Japan cannot exert 
its soft power efficiently in these countries. 
2. What Makes Japan’s Soft Power 
2.1. Japan’s Culture 
Japanese culture, including both traditional and popular culture has been increasingly 
popular around the world. As Lee and Melissen put it, “Japan‟s cultural attraction, both for 
the distinctive elements of Japan‟s ancient culture and modern culture has been the most 
distinguishing part of its soft power”92. Gilbert Rozman suggested that the high degree of 
Japan‟s soft power derives from the charm of her affluent and free society, and the appeal of 
her traditional as well as contemporary culture
93
. One example of traditional culture which 
embraces a great attraction not only to Japanese people but also people around the world is 
Haiku, a short and special form of Japanese poetry. With a history of over 400 years, since the 
end of the 19
th
 century, Haiku has been introduced to the rest of the world. To date, Haiku has 
been developed in over 50 countries around the globe with about 2 million people writing 
Haiku poems in 30 different languages
94
. Great attraction can also been found in Japanese 
contemporary or pop culture in various forms such as popular films, television program, 
manga, music or video games. Japanese government also acknowledged that culture is an 
important field within the diplomacy of Japan, and its role has become more and more 
important in recent years
95
. Moreover, with the assistance of technological advancements 
including the internet, international community has been familiar with and become fond of 
Japan‟s cultural products such as J-pop, Japan‟s television dramas, video games, anime and 
manga. For example, if asked about Japanese cuisine, most will produce the same answer 
“sushi”. A long queue of international students waiting for being served at the sushi kiosk at 
Victoria University of Wellington reveals the attraction of Japanese cuisine. Apart from 
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exporting cultural products, Japan has organized various cultural activities to promote its 
culture and values. For example, with the establishment and development of Japan 
Foundation all over the world, Japan aims to provide Japanese language training, art 
performance and Japan study to people around the globe. In addition, various activities and 
events are held around the world to celebrate and follow Japan pop culture such as cosplay, 
origami paper crafts, etc… Japan Cool, the concept about the attraction of Japan‟s pop culture 
has become the unique “brand name” of Japan culture. Utpal Vyas noted that the Japan 
Foundation, as a cultural agency of the Japanese government, was expected to enable the 
process of enabling Japan‟s ideas and values to be accepted and integrated by foreign publics 
through a range of cultural activities. If this process is successful, the Foundation can be 
considered to be an agent of Japan‟s soft power. Furthermore, in Otmazgin‟s analysis, Japan‟s 
cultural policy and cultural diplomacy has changed dramatically over the past one hundred 
years, from actively introducing and imposing Japanese culture during its empire-building 
period, to essentially avoiding the promotion of Japanese culture in Asia for most of the 
postwar period, and more recently, to supporting and encouraging the export of Japanese 
contemporary culture and lifestyle in order to obtain “soft power”96. Therefore, it is 
undeniable that culture has served as an important element which helps enhance Japan‟s soft 
power as well as its national power.  
2.2. Japan’s Political Values 
“Japan has long been characterized as a largely conservative, group-based society 
where the individual‟s freedom of thought and expression is positioned secondary to group 
obligations”97. This culture has exerted a profound impact on Japanese political behavior and 
values. The concepts of uniformity, homogeneity and hierarchy
98
 are often mentioned in 
Japanese traditional political values. Moreover, Japan‟s key political values can be clearly 
seen its present constitution with the desire and commitment for peace. As stated in the article 
9, “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat 
or use of force as means of settling international disputes”. And the preamble of the 
constitution clearly states the importance of Peace, Human Rights and Human Security. 
Regarding human security, Japan takes into account both the elements of freedom from fear 
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and freedom from want
99
. Japan is also the founder and the main donor of the UN Trust Fund 
for Human Security
100
. As a matter of fact, Japan does not have any universal political values 
to export to other countries (like the case of the United States or the United Kingdom with 
democracy or human rights). Moreover, despite strongly supporting liberal and democratic 
values, the Japanese government has not effectively utilized political ideology in its 
international relations
101
. Therefore, political values are not and cannot be an important 
instrument of Japan‟s soft power (the most important one should be its culture, as analyzed 
above). 
2.3. Japan’s Foreign Policy 
Since the end of World War II, maintaining a close relationship with the United States 
has been a foundation of Japan‟s foreign policy. The two countries signed the Security Treaty 
in 1951. Since then the treaty has experienced several times of revision and renewal; and the 
Japan – US relations have been increasingly close. Japan has benefited much from this treaty. 
The most significant one is to focus foreign policy on economic development. Another benefit 
which is closely related to a source of Japan‟s soft power is to attract other US allies. Apart 
from the security treaty with the United States, ODA policy is also of great importance in 
Japan‟s foreign policy. Official Development Aid (in the form of grants and loan aid) from 
Japan prioritizes economic development, economic interdependence and political stability
102
. 
Since the late 1970s Japanese government has provided a great amount of ODA to 
underdeveloped countries with the aim of expanding its international influence
103
. To date, 
Japan is among the largest aid donors in the world.  Furthermore, Japan has realized the 
significance of its culture as a source of soft power for Japan. As a result, Japan has strived to 
strengthen its public diplomacy. For example, Japan‟s Foreign Ministry appointed the popular 
cartoon character Doraemon as the nation‟s first „anime ambassador‟ as part of the effort to 
spread Japanese culture.  
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In sum, despite facing several limitations, with impressive resources, Japan has a great 
potential to develop its soft power. The Japanese government has realized the significant role 
of soft power and has conducted various policies to maximize it. It is undoubtedly that the 
most important pillar of Japan‟s soft power is culture. Cultural diplomacy as well as public 
diplomacy has included cultural aspects of Japan in its activities, effectively contributing to 
the expansion of Japanese culture to the outside world. However, in East Asia while much has 
been written and talked about Chinese soft power and public diplomacy, it seems that 
academic discourse has not adequately concentrated on analyzing public diplomacy in Japan. 
Japan is quite late in realizing the significance of public diplomacy (it was officially adopted 
by Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004 with the establishment of the division of Public 
Diplomacy
104
). However, public diplomacy is an important tool to enhance Japanese soft 
power. Therefore, a brief insight into Japan‟s public diplomacy is crucial to fully understand 
how it could contribute to expanding Japan‟s soft power. 
II. JAPAN’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
1. Overview of Japan’s Public Diplomacy 
As mentioned above, public diplomacy is a relatively new concept in Japan. However, 
as Mitsuru Kitano analyzed, “the origin of Japan‟s public diplomacy in the sense of striving to 
improve Japan‟s national image abroad dates back to peace treaty negotiations following the 
Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905, when Japan and Russia each made every effort to attract 
U.S. public support”105). This means that public diplomacy has recently been officially 
adopted by Japanese government. However, it was actually used by Japanese leaders centuries 
ago.  
Japan has been devoted more efforts to utilizing public diplomacy. As defined by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, public diplomacy aims at fulfilling several important 
functions. First of all, it should assist the dissemination of international situation and 
diplomatic policies in Japan. Furthermore, it is expected to inform foreign publics of Japan‟s 
domestic situation as well as its diplomatic and foreign policies. The next function concerns 
the implementation of international agreements to promote cultural exchange. Additionally, 
public diplomacy should promote cooperation between Japan with international cultural 
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organizations. And, last but not least, public diplomacy helps present Japanese culture abroad 
and promote cultural exchanges with foreign countries
106
. 
With these functions, the Japanese government expects that public diplomacy could 
help exert positive influence on the understanding of foreign people about Japan. Cultural 
diplomacy can be said to be the first and the most important element of Japan‟s public 
diplomacy. Pop-culture, in addition to traditional culture and art serve as primary tools for 
cultural diplomacy
107
. As an illustration, "the International MANGA Award" was created in 
2007 upon the initiative of then-Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Taro Aso with the aim of 
awarding MANGA creators who contribute to the spread of MANGA culture overseas. Apart 
for cultural exchange, Japanese government has utilized various tools of public diplomacy. 
According to Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan‟s public diplomacy‟s activities fall 
into six categories which include (1) public relations abroad, (2) dispatches from Japan, (3) 
cultural exchange, (4) people-to-people exchange, (5) cooperation with international cultural 
organizations and (6) cultural grant assistance
108. Serving as important tools of Japan‟s public 
diplomacy, contributing to the enhancement of its soft power, the first four categories which 
are the important tools of Japan‟s public diplomacy will be analyzed in the following section. 
2. Tools of Japan’s Public Diplomacy 
2.1. Public Relations Abroad 
As a component of public diplomacy in Japan, public relations play an important role 
in Japan foreign policy. The Diplomatic Bluebook suggested that an understanding and a 
positive view of Japan and Japan's foreign policy by foreign people are essential elements in 
Japan's foreign policy
109
. Therefore, Government of Japan set up a special division to manage 
public relations called the Public Relations Office of the Government of Japan.  The major 
function of this office is to introduce the Japan‟s cutting-edge solutions to various global 
issues rooted in Japan's traditions and experiences
110
. 
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, public relations in Japan 
involves providing foreign people with information about Japan's foreign policy as well as 
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Japan‟s politics, economy, society, and culture. The main focus of public relations is to shape 
a positive view of Japan by foreign publics. The dissemination of information about Japan can 
be done through publications about Japan; speeches delivered by Japanese diplomats; 
appearances or articles in the local media; press release; organizing events to introduce Japan; 
invitation of foreign reporters to Japan; dispatch of Japanese delegates to international 
symposiums and conferences which can influence international public opinion; and supply of 
printed matter and audiovisual materials in foreign languages. For example, in a period of one 
month, Japan took a total of about 1,500 actions of international public relations in connection 
with the March 11 disaster. These included TV appearances, interviews, press releases, and 
messages from ambassadors
111
. Another example of public relations activities regarding 
overseas events to introduce Japan was “Japan Night”. On January 24, 2013 "Japan Night" 
was held as a side event at the Davos Conference in Switzerland. The event opened with the 
broadcast of a video message by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe himself, who addressed the 
participants in English
112
. Moreover, Japanese Government has set up a website named Web 
Japan to provide general information about Japanese politics, economy, culture, etc for 
domestic and foreign people. Another measure of public relations relates to the conduct of 
surveys and opinion polls to implement effective overseas public relations. Opinion polls on 
Japan image in selected countries have been conducted almost every year since 1960
113
. 
Furthermore, as part of the Japanese government's Visit Japan Campaign which is aimed at 
making Japan a tourism-oriented country, the Foreign Ministry encourages foreign travelers 
to come to Japan by publicizing the attractions of the country and supporting bids to host 
international meetings in Japan
114
. 
2.2. Peace-keeping Efforts 
Although war has been increasingly rare (the last major war in Asia happened over 
three decades ago), regional conflicts and internal wars still persist and even are on the 
increase. Take East Asia as an example. Territorial disputes over the South China Sea as well 
as over Diaoyu/Senkaku and Takeshima/Dokdo are among various current regional conflicts 
which should be urgently settled. Conflicts exert negative impact on the development and 
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prosperity of not only the concerned parties but also the outside world. Therefore, 
peacekeeping is an important duty of not only related parties but also others.  According to the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affair, Japan must play a responsible role in the international 
community as a "Peace Fostering Nation"
115
. Japan's peace-building efforts consist of the 
three major pillars. The first pillar is engagement on the ground. In 1992, Japan ratified the 
International Peace Cooperation Law with a legal framework for comprehensive cooperation 
to promote international peace and security with the United Nations playing the central role. 
Since then Japan Self-Defense Forces and civilian personnel has participated in peacekeeping 
operations in needed areas such as Cambodia, Mozambique or South Sudan. Apart from 
peace-keeping, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) also conducted public diplomacy as a 
part of their operation. For example, the JSDF in Samawa, Iraq “earned the trust of many of 
the local Iraqi people by showing to them their diligence, discipline, readiness, and high 
morale as well as their goodwill, humility, and friendliness”116. The second pillar of Japan‟s 
peace-keeping efforts is intellectual contributions. The contribution may concern the 
formulation of strategies in conflict prevention to reconstruction. Human resource 
development is the third pillar of Japan‟s peace-keeping efforts. Japan began the Pilot 
Program for Human Resource Development in Asia for Peace-building in 2007 with the 
objective of training civilians from Japan and other Asian countries
117
. 
2.3. Cultural Exchange 
Culture serves as an important factor in Japan‟s public diplomacy. Cultural exchange, 
defined by Kazuo Ogoura as cultural activities undertaken not as a political means to bolster a 
nation‟s image (cultural diplomacy) but for the purpose of mutual inspiration through 
international exchange
118
. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe described politics and 
economy as the two "wheels" to speed up bilateral ties, and culture as the bond. Therefore, 
people should learn about the culture of others
119
. Like overseas public relations, cultural 
exchange can be an efficient tool to create an accurate understanding and positive view of 
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foreign governments and foreign citizens about Japan. A favorable image of Japan perceived 
by the outside world is certainly much better for the implementation of its diplomatic polices 
than the unfavorable one. With this awareness in mind, Japanese government has made every 
effort to introduce the attraction of Japanese culture to the world. The Government has started 
a wide range of initiatives including cultural exchange and cooperation as well as supporting 
the international exchange activities of private entities
120
. One prominent initiative in cultural 
exchange is the "Anime Ambassador" project which concentrates on introducing and 
attracting the interest of foreign people in Japan through Anime
121
. In 2008, Doreamon (the 
robotic cat) was chosen as the Anime Ambassador of Japan. This initiative can also be 
categorized as pop-culture diplomacy. Apart from pop-culture diplomacy, Japan‟s cultural 
exchange may be in form of Japanese language education. As Lam pointed out, one of the 
limits of Japan‟s soft power is the lack of a popular language122 like English or French. 
Therefore, Japanese Government is expecting and trying to “internationalize” its language. 
Through the Japan Foundation, Japan is dispatching Japanese language education specialists 
overseas, training within Japan overseas Japanese instructors and students, donating and 
developing Japanese language education materials and holding Japanese speech contests at 
overseas diplomatic establishments
123
. Japanese studies and intellectual exchange are other 
forms of Japan‟s cultural exchange. The Japanese Government is supporting research 
overseas related to the politics, economy, society and culture of Japan. Furthermore, Japan is 
planning, executing and supporting projects concerning cooperative work or exchange with 
other countries, for the purpose of promoting the intellectual contribution and communication 
by Japan towards world development and stability
124
. 
2.4. People-to-people Exchange 
“People believe their own eyes and ears, and what they have observed will help 
change stereotyped thinking… People-to-people or non-governmental exchanges are 
sometimes more effective than publicity programs”125. Therefore, people-to-people exchange 
plays an important role in not only bolstering mutual understanding but also in shaping a more 
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positive view of foreign people towards others. Japanese leaders have also acknowledged the 
importance of people-to-people exchange in strengthening relations between Japan and other 
countries. For example, in his speech in Singapore, the final stop of his visits to ASEAN 
countries in 2002, the then Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi emphasized that 
“Cooperation is working in common purpose with others in order to accomplish more []This 
cooperation requires an exchange of ideas, opinions and people”126. As a result, Japanese 
government has promoted people-to-people exchange in various forms encompassing student 
exchange program, youth exchange and sport exchange
127
.  
Regarding student exchange program, as Nye pointed out, universities and other non-
state actors can “develop soft power of their own that may reinforce or be at odds with official 
foreign goals”128. Therefore, there is a close connection between student exchange and the 
reinforcement of soft power. More specifically, as noted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, student exchange helps promote friendship and goodwill with other countries and gain 
their understanding toward Japan. From that perspective, Japan promotes student exchange 
programs with various countries, welcoming young people from around the world to study in 
Japan
129
. For example, there are a considerable number of Japanese students studying in the 
United States. In 2011-2012, 19,900 Japanese students were enrolled in American colleges 
and universities
130
. And as of May 1, 2012, there are 137,756 international students in 
Japan
131. The Government of Japan is promoting the “Plan to accept 300,000 international 
students”132, an initiative aimed at doubling the current number of international students by 
2020. 
Youth exchange is another form of people-to-people exchange conducted by Japan as 
a tool of public diplomacy. The youth is usually considered as a country‟s future; therefore, 
they should be paid due attention in any government policy including public diplomacy. The 
youth participating in exchange programs can become the bridge of friendship between the 
host country and their home country. Therefore, with the aim of influencing young people in 
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other countries to develop a positive view of Japan, Japan has initiated numerous youth 
exchange programs. One example of such program is the JET (Japan and Teaching Program). 
This program is co-organized by Ministries of Japan and local governments. Young people 
around the world are invited to teach languages, sports, etc in junior-high and high schools in 
Japan or to work in local governments in order to foster international exchange in local 
communities
133
. Another example, which is more specific to mention here is the Global Youth 
Exchange Program (GYE). The Program was initiated in 1995 by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan. It targets young people around the world who will exchange views on global 
issues
134
. The program aims to foster mutual understanding about Japan and the outside 
world. The JENESYS 2.0 (Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths) 
incorporates both student and youth exchange in one program. It serves as a key platform for 
youth exchange between ASEAN and Japan. The program was announced by Prime Minister 
of Japan Shinzo Abe during his visit to Indonesia in January 2013. Approximately 30,000 
youths from Asia/Oceania region including 10,000 youths from ASEAN countries, will have 
an opportunity to visit Japan in 2013
135
. The original program was successfully conducted in 
2007 – 2012, bringing more than 13,500 ASEAN youth who were university students to 
Japan
136
. Another example is the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program 
(SSEAYP), which will be used later in this dissertation as a case-study. Ever since the first 
program in 1974, annually, the program annually brings together about 300 youths from ten 
countries of Southeast Asia and Japan to foster friendship among participants as well as to 
enhance international understanding about Japan and related countries. 
Sports, as a part of culture, can be an important source of soft power. For example, 
Nye noted that popular sports can play an important role in communicating American 
values
137. The European Sports Charter 1992 stated that “sports reinforce the bonds between 
peoples”138.  Japan has introduced its traditional sports such as Judo, Kendo and Karate to the 
outside world. Many of its traditional sports have been used in international and regional 
sports games. Moreover, Japan also supports activities to host large scale international sport 
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games such as the Olympic Games and the Soccer World Cup
139
. The country has also 
developed sports exchange, especially in football, with regional counterparts in such activities 
as the ASEAN – Japan Exchange Year 2003, the Japan – Korea Friendship Year 2005140 or 
the Asian Cup which is held every four years.  
In short, with regard to soft power, Japan benefits from impressive resources, 
especially its culture. Moreover, as a tool to enhance its soft power, Japan utilized various 
areas in its public diplomacy. As public diplomacy is closely related to foreign policy, 
especially a country‟s national interests in another country, in order to examine Japan‟s public 
diplomacy in Vietnam, an analysis of Japan‟s foreign policy toward this country is definitely 
necessary. 
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CHAPTER 3: JAPAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM 
 
 Chapter 1 is devoted to analyze the analytical framework soft power, the non-material 
form of power, and public diplomacy; in which public diplomacy is considered as one of the 
tools to enhance a country‟s soft power.  In chapter 2, Japan is used as an empirical work with 
an analysis of the dimensions of its soft power and public diplomacy strategy.  
This chapter reviews Japan – Vietnam relations and analyzes how Japan has adopted 
its foreign policy in Vietnam to serve its national interests in the country.  
I.  SOUTHEAST ASIA IN JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY: RESPONDING TO WH-
QUESTIONS 
1. WHY Southeast Asia? 
Southeast Asia is a part of Asia which is at the crossroad of Indian Ocean and Pacific 
Ocean.  It comprises of countries which are geographically south of China, east of India and 
north of Australia. This region is rich in forest and natural resources ranging from oil to a 
variety of minerals. Southeast Asia has become one of the major centres of the world not only 
in political and cultural realms but in the economic domain as well. It is also one of the most 
dynamically developing regions in the world. For example, in 2012, the whole ASEAN region 
registered economic growth of 5.7%. In 2011, ASEAN's gross domestic product accounted 
for 3.1% of global GDP, about six times the share in 1990
141
.  
As an important region, Southeast Asia has generated strong motivations for Japan to 
build up relations both with the region as a whole and with regional countries. First of all, 
economically, South East Asia is a strategic region because Japan is far too dependent on the 
region both as providers of natural resources and export markets for its products. Moreover, 
as a potential market with low labor costs, Southeast Asia is certainly an attractive destination 
for Japanese investors. Geographically, Southeast Asia holds key positions for traffic linking 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and is an 
important region for Japan
142
. Moreover, locating at the heart of Asia, the prosperity of 
ASEAN is of great importance to the stability and development of other regions. Politically, 
ASEAN is also the place where major powers compete for influence. With the rise of China, 
                                                 
141
 'Speech by H.E. Mr. Fumio Kishida, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the 19th International 
Conference on "The Future of Asia"‟ 
142
 „Japan Defense White Paper 2012‟, p.59  
35 
 
 
 
Japan has no other option than tightening its relations with this region. Moreover, Japan also 
definitely needs support from ten ASEAN countries for its quest for a permanent seat in the 
United Nations Security Council. And last but not least, Japan enjoys favorable conditions to 
foster relations with Southeast Asian countries. Consequently, Japan has played an active 
political role in Southeast Asia; and surprisingly, this role is even larger than in the country‟s 
Northeast Asia neighborhood. Part of the explanation may be, compared to Northeast Asia, 
Japan relations with Southeast Asia suffer less historical constraints and no territorial 
disputes
143
. To be more specific, according to Lam, there are still some unresolved war-
related and territorial issues between Japan and its Northeast counterparts including China, 
South Korea and North Korea. For example, the issue of comfort women
144
 still serves as a 
hindrance in the relations between Japan and these three countries despite Japanese huge 
efforts to settle. (Japanese government formally apologized in 1993 to these comfort women 
and in 1995 to nations that suffered from Japanese aggression during the war
145
). In South 
Korea, from 1992 until 2011, there were one thousand weekly protests in front of Japanese 
Embassy in Seoul by former comfort women and their supporters
146
, requesting a proper 
apology from Japanese government. Moreover, the territorial disputes over Senkaku/Diaoyu 
and Takeshima/Dokdo between Japan and China and South Korea have constituted serious 
impediments to relations between these states in political as well as economic domains. On 
the contrary, because of the much shorter period of Japanese occupation, the war-related 
issues of Japan in Southeast Asia are minimal compared to those in Northeast Asia. 
Moreover, there are no territorial disputes between Japan and Southeast Asian states. Another 
consideration is that in response to a rising China perceived by outsiders, especially regional 
countries as a threat, Japan happens to be a more reliable partner. As a result, Southeast Asia 
countries are more open to Japan‟s diplomatic initiatives, especially if these are also to their 
advantage
147
. 
In short, Southeast Asia is an important region in the international arena in terms of 
economic, political and other realms. The region also plays an important role in Japan‟s 
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foreign policy as Japan definitely needs it both economically and politically. As a result, 
depending on each period of historical development, Japan would formulate a proper foreign 
policy to foster its relations with Southeast Asian countries. 
2. WHAT Policy? 
The conventional wisdom is that Japanese foreign policy “is generally passive, 
reactive, and driven primarily by economics” and relations with the United States148. 
However, in fact, Japan has been very active in strengthening its diplomatic relations with 
Southeast Asia. Japan‟s Southeast Asia foreign policy was first introduced in the early Meiji 
period (1868-1912) with its ambition to dominate Asia by its pre-eminent economic and 
military might
149
. During the World War II, the Japan planned to annex territories throughout 
Southeast Asia was aimed at building a more powerful East Asia. However Japan could not 
materialize this plan because of its defeat in the war. After the World War II, with the signing 
of the Japan – US Security Treaty, Japan‟s foreign policy in general and Japan‟s Southeast 
Asia foreign policy in particular depended largely on the United States. With the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty Japan carried out payment of reparations (or economic diplomacy) to 
countries including those in Southeast Asia that suffered during the war
150
. The period of 
1976 and 1991 witnessed an impressive development in Japan – Southeast Asia relations, 
especially with the proclamation of the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977, “the blueprint of Japan‟s 
foreign policy towards Southeast Asia”, “postwar Japan‟s first codification of its foreign 
policy principles towards Southeast Asia
151”. The doctrine consisted of three key points: 
rejection of the role of a military power, promotion of the relationship of mutual confidence 
and trust ("heart-to-heart" diplomacy), and equal partnership with ASEAN for building peace 
and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia
152
. During the Cold War, although there were some 
impediments for Japan to fulfill its commitments in the Doctrine, especially the Cambodia 
issue,
153
 Japan mainly did “translate” the Doctrine into action. With heart-to-heart 
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relationship, Japan became the largest donor of ODA to developing ASEAN states. And there 
was no direct military intervention by Japan into the region. As a direct consequence of the 
Fukuda Doctrine, Japan's relations with ASEAN improved dramatically, and many of these 
nations not just received Japan's official development aid but also saw an exponential rise in 
Japanese private investment, which in turn boosted trade of these nations with Japan and 
elsewhere
154
. In the post-Cold War era, Japan continued to fulfill its commitments in the 
Fukuda Doctrine by playing an active role in Southeast Asia. Following its resumption of 
ODA to Vietnam in 1992, Japan‟s Southeast Asia foreign policy developed to a new height. 
In 1997, during his ASEAN‟s trip, the then Prime Minister Hashimoto stressed the 
importance of widening the relationship of Japan and ASEAN. He maintained that the 
relationship should not be limited to economic and trade, but should also include other fields 
such as cultural exchange, etc. He also proposed a more frequent dialogue at the summit 
level
155. With some new development in Japan‟s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia, what 
Hashimoto mentioned above was sometimes referred as “Hashimoto Doctrine”. Five years 
later, in January 2002, in his keynote speech entitled “Japan and ASEAN in East Asia” in the 
framework of the ASEAN trip, the then Prime Minister Koizumi called for closer economic 
and security ties between Japan and Southeast Asian countries. He proposed an Initiative for 
Japan – ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership which would expand ties from 
traditional areas of trade and investment to areas such as science and technology, human 
resource development and tourism
156
. That was all about the so-called Koizumi Doctrine. 
Japan‟s Southeast Asia foreign policy was “upgraded” to another level with the new “Fukuda 
Doctrine” developed by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (son of Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda) 
in his speech entitled “Toward the Day When the Pacific Ocean Becomes an Inland Sea in 
2008. Japan promised to support ASEAN‟s effort to create a single integrated market by 2015 
because the creation of such a market demands the eradication of gaps within the ASEAN 
region and the development of the Mekong River region
157
. And recently, in early 2013, 
during his visit to Southeast Asia, the newly re-elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe affirmed 
that relations with ASEAN form “a supremely vital linchpin” for Japan‟s diplomatic strategy 
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and spoke about five new principles for Japanese diplomacy which can be referred as Japan‟s 
ASEAN diplomacy
158. With these principles, Japan‟s foreign policy toward Southeast Asia 
has been developed in various dimensions. Traditionally, Japan‟s relations with Southeast 
Asia mainly focused on the triad of trade, investment and aid, which has been so far very 
successful
159
. Now Japan attaches greater importance to other tools such as cultural exchange 
and people-to-people exchange (with special attention to youth exchange). Among five 
principles, there are two principles related to fostering people to people exchange between 
Japan and Southeast Asia. One is about “bringing ever more fruitful intercultural ties among 
peoples of Japan and this region”. And the other is about “promoting exchange among 
younger generations who will carry our nations into the future”160. Moreover, Japan Foreign 
Minister Fumio Kishida further affirmed the significance of people-to-people exchange in 
Japan‟s foreign policy toward Southeast Asia when he maintained that “deeper mutual 
understanding and relationships of trust are fostered by reciprocal visits to each other's 
countries, tasting local specialties and gaining hands-on experiences of diverse and rich 
cultures
161” 
In brief, there has been significant development in Japan‟s foreign policy toward 
Southeast Asia from the “blueprint” Fukuda Doctrine to Hashimoto, Koizumi and Abe. 
Japan‟s relations with the region are not limited to economic and political realms. The 
relations are increasingly expanded to other fields such as security, culture and exchange.  
II. VIETNAM IN JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY 
1.  Overview of Vietnam  
Shaped like an elongated S, Vietnam stretches the length of the Indochinese Peninsula 
covering a surface area of 128,000 square miles with China in the north, Laos and Cambodia 
in the west, and the South China Sea in the east. The total population in Vietnam was last 
recorded at approximately 90 million according to the General Statistics of Vietnam 2012, 
which ranked the third in Southeast Asia and the 14
th
 in the list of the most populous nations 
in the world
162
. Since the adoption of Doi Moi (reform) policy in 1986, Vietnam has 
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experienced rapid and impressive social and economic development. Vietnam has become a 
low-middle income country with GDP per capita over 1,200 USD in 2011
163
. Vietnam has 
joined more than 70 regional and international institutions/regimes including the most 
prominent ones such as United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, APEC, etc. It 
has established diplomatic relations with 179 out of 193 United Nations member countries 
and developed eco-trade ties with 230 out of 255 countries-territories in the world. To date it 
has upgraded to strategic partnership with 9 countries including Russia, Japan, India, China, 
South Korea Spain, the UK, Germany and Indonesia. 
The role and status of Vietnam in the regional and international arena has been 
considerably improved, especially in the front of multilateral diplomacy. It fulfilled the role of 
a non-permanent member and one-month chairman twice of the United Nations Security 
Council (2008-9). Moreover, it successfully assumed the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010 
under the theme “ASEAN community: from vision to action”. At present, Vietnam is 
assuming the first ever Vietnamese Secretary General of ASEAN (2013-2017). The country is 
lobbying for hosting APEC Summit in 2018, UNHRC (2014-2016), UNSC (2020-2021), 
ECOSOC (2016-2018). It is negotiating to participate in the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
as well as to join Free Trade Agreement with European Union and the Russia-Belarus-
Kazakhstan Customs Union
164
. 
Shortly, Vietnam is a country with increasingly economic and political role in the 
region and the world. As a dynamically emerging economy, Vietnam is certainly attracting 
the outside world as both a potential import market and an attractive destination for foreign 
investment. Moreover, an increasingly active and positive participation in the regional and 
world affairs has consolidated and enhanced the political status of Vietnam, enabling it to be 
an important partner in the foreign policy of many other countries including Japan.   
2. Background of Japan – Vietnam relations 
2.1. Early Periods 
Early contacts between Vietnam and Japan date back to the Nara era (710-794) when 
Buttetsu, a Vietnamese Buddhist monk traveled to Japan by sea in 736 to introduce Mahayana 
Buddhism. During this time, in 753 Nakamaro Abe, a scholar studying in China, was said to 
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be the first Japanese to set food in Vietnam as a governor to mediate between disputing ethnic 
minorities in the border between Vietnam and China
165
. However, not until at least 15
th
 or 16
th
 
century when Japanese commercial ships frequented Vietnam‟s harbors were Japan – 
Vietnam trade relations established. Over a century ago from 1905 to 1908 the so-called 
“Exodus to the East” (“phong trao Dong Du”) was initiated to send Vietnamese youths to 
Japan to study the Meiji Restoration
166
.  
2.2. Before and During Cold War 
During World War II, Japan invaded and occupied Vietnam, a nation on the eastern 
edge of the Indochina Peninsula in Southeast Asia that had been under French administration 
since the late 19th century
167
. Under the struggle of the Vietnamese army, Japan had to 
withdraw its forces in 1945. During the Vietnam War against the United States, many 
Japanese, especially left wingers and antiwar activists, protested against Japan‟s support for 
the US in the war. After the conclusion of the Paris accords
168
 in January 1973, the Japanese 
started to think about “a huge international project in postwar Indochina”169. As a result, 
Japan officially established diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(North Vietnam) on September 21, 1973 with the expectation that it will contribute to the 
peace and stability of Indo-china
170
. Two years later, Embassies were set up in the capital of 
each country. From this action, together with the huge difference in political systems between 
Japan and Vietnam as well as the complexity of the international situation, it can be viewed 
that Japan expressed its goodwill to establish and strengthen relations with Vietnam. With 
regard to the international situation, during the 1960s and 1970s other Southeast Asian 
countries, especially the founding members of ASEAN viewed Vietnam as a threat of 
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communist insurgency; and during the American war, most of them supported the United 
States against Vietnam; whereas Vietnam conceived that the real nature of ASEAN was to 
defend the interests of US neo-colonialism in Southeast Asia‟171. Although Vietnam and the 
then ASEAN members had hostile perceptions towards each other, Japan decided to shake 
hands with Vietnam. The bilateral relations accelerated in a further step when in 1974, 
Japanese and Vietnamese politicians established the League for Japan-Vietnam Friendship to 
promote mutual understanding and friendship. The fall of Saigon in April 1975 further 
accelerated Japanese activism in Indochina. Japan attempted to gain influence in Vietnam 
through spending strategies, particularly through the disbursement of ODA. The two countries 
signed an agreement on Japan war reparations in the form of non-refundable aid worth 13.5 
billion yen (approximately 49 billion US dollars). However, during the period of 1979 and 
1990, due to Cambodian issues
172
, Japan discontinued its aid to Vietnam.  
2.3. Post Cold War 
The settlement of the Cambodian conflict was a necessary condition if Tokyo wished 
to improve relations with Vietnam and conduct active diplomacy in Indochina. The peace 
process paved the way for Tokyo‟s resumption of full-scale aid to Vietnam in 1992 for the 
first time in thirteen years
173
. Since then the relationship between Vietnam and Japan has 
developed in various fields. A great milestone in the relations between two countries was the 
official visit by Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to Japan, opening a new phase of 
co-operation towards “strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japan for peace and 
prosperity in Asia". In 2007, for the first time in the history of the Japan – Vietnam relations, 
President of Vietnam visited Japan. In December 2008, the two countries signed Vietnam – 
Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (VJEPA). This is a comprehensive bilateral 
agreement that will boost trade liberalization of goods and services, economic cooperation 
and investment. The Japan – Vietnam Joint Statement announced by Prime Ministers of two 
countries in October 2011 on the actions under strategic partnership was another milestone 
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which demonstrated the two sides‟ further commitment to strengthening comprehensive 
cooperation, contributing to peace and stability in Asia
174
. Recently, the visit by the newly re-
elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe‟s in January 2013 (which was his first overseas trip after 
his election last year and second visit to Vietnam as the Japanese Prime Minister) marked a 
further step in Vietnam-Japan strategic partnership in politics, security and national defense. 
During this visit, the two Prime Ministers announced the opening of the 2013 Vietnam-Japan 
Friendship Year to celebrate the 40th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic ties
175
. Together with 
the impressive development in political ties, economic cooperation between Vietnam and 
Japan has also been strengthened substantially. To date, Japan has become one of the major 
economic partners of Vietnam. Bilateral trade between Japan and Vietnam in 2010 reached 21 
billion
176
 and is expected to amount to 29 billion USD in 2013
177
. Moreover, the country is 
currently the leading foreign investor in Vietnam with 1,900 projects, value at 31.84 billion 
US dollars
178
. Japan is now the biggest foreign aid provider to Vietnam with an agreed 
amount of over $2 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) in fiscal year 2012-
2014
179
. 
Briefly, Japan – Vietnam relations have experienced numerous ups and downs ever 
since their early establishment. It can be said that the current period is the most developed one 
which witnesses remarkable improvement in various fields. This helps explain why Vietnam 
holds an important position in Japan‟s foreign policy, which will be discussed in the 
following section. 
3. Vietnam in Japan’s Foreign Policy: Responding to Wh-questions 
3.1. WHY Vietnam? 
Vietnam is a major power in Southeast Asia; and it is one of Japan's strategic partners 
for peace and prosperity in Asia
180
. During his visit to Vietnam in January 2013, Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed that Vietnam was an important partner for Japan with 
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shared regional challenges and a mutually complementary economic relationship
181
. 
Furthermore, as analyzed earlier, Vietnam has been highly recognized both economically and 
politically by regional and global nations. With regard to economic perspective, GDP growth 
has averaged 7.2% in the last 20 years, which is among the highest rates in the whole of the 
global frontier and emerging Asian space
182
. Therefore, Vietnam is an attractive destination 
for Japanese investors as well as a potential markets for Japanese imports. It also serves as an 
important provider of resources for Japan. Moreover, Japan also needs Vietnam to serve its 
political goals in Southeast Asia as well as in Asia Pacific. Undoubtedly, Vietnam attracts 
enormous attraction from Japanese policy makers.  
3.2. WHAT for? 
As a matter of fact, the exact goals of Japan‟s relations with Vietnam as well as its 
foreign policy toward this country are of two categories: economic and political-security one. 
In other words, there are both economic and political-security motivations for Japan to foster 
relations with Vietnam. These two motivations or “goals” supplement each other. Sometimes 
economic tools serve as a “means” and political outcomes serve as an “end” and vice versa. 
For example, the provision of ODA to Vietnam (an economic tool) enables Japan to gain 
more support from Vietnam in the international affairs (a political outcome). And a good 
relationship between Japan and Vietnam (political tool) can boost trade between two countries 
(economic outcome).  
3.2.1. Economic interests 
Regarding economic interests, it can be said that the most significant impact of 
Japan‟s foreign policy toward Vietnam can be seen in the economic dimension. Put it another 
way, the ultimate goal of Japan in its relations with Vietnam is to serve its economic interests. 
Moreover, economic relations can serve as solid foundations for expanding relations in other 
fields as well as for increasing Japan‟s influence in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia region. On 
the Japan‟s side, there are a variety of beneficiaries from Japan‟s relations with Vietnam 
which range from Japanese businesses to Japanese consumers. However, in the long run it is 
the Japanese economy that benefits most.  
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First of all, economic relations with Vietnam bring about a considerable source of 
supply and demand for Japanese economy. Supply here means that Vietnam acts an important 
provider of products that are in high demand by Japanese people such as leather and footwear 
products, farm produce, seafood and consumer goods. Moreover, according to Vu Tien Loc, 
Chair of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), a lot of Vietnamese export 
items to Japan are not the advantageous products of the country, most of which cannot be 
made in Japan or made at very high production costs
183
. Therefore, Japan benefits greatly 
from importing Vietnamese products. This helps explain why Vietnamese products account 
for a consideration proportion of the total imports of Japan. For example, in 2012 Vietnam‟s 
garments reached a turnover of US$1.97 billion, equal to 6.2 percent of the Japanese 
imports
184
. Also in 2012, the total volume of Vietnam‟s exports reached US$13billion185. 
Figure 1 below reveals that Vietnam is among the four largest exporters from ASEAN to 
Japan in 2012, accounting for 12 percent of the total number. 
 
Figure 1: Share of exports from ASEAN countries to Japan in 2012 
 
(Source: Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics)  
Moreover, due to the falling birth rate and the aging population, the labor force in 
Japan is expected to shrink in the long run. For example, in 1998, Japan‟s labor force recorded 
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a historical high of 67.93 million people. However, the number dropped to 62.61 million in 
2011
186
. Therefore, Japan is in need of a large quantity of foreign workers, especially in the 
aftermath of the disastrous earthquake and tsunami in March 2011. Against this background, 
human resources from Vietnam can serve as an important supply of labor to Japan. However, 
out of about 700,000 foreign workers in Japan
187
, Vietnam now has 20,000 workers and 
apprentices in this country
188
, accounting for just about 3 percent of the total. Whereas, the 
majority of Vietnamese people working abroad are in other markets such as Taiwan, Korea or 
Malaysia. This means that Vietnam is still a potential supplier of labor for Japan to recruit 
foreign workers. According to the Japanese International Training Cooperation Organization 
(JITCO), every year Japan is keen to receive around 10,000 Vietnamese workers working in 
Japan‟s agricultural and seafood-processing sectors189. Moreover, as Japan is the leading 
foreign direct investor in Vietnam, there is a huge demand for Vietnamese labors working in 
Japanese companies in the country. For example, there is about 10,000 Vietnamese staff 
working for Honda Vietnam
190
.  
With regard to demand (or market for Japan‟s exports), Vietnam is now ranked the 
third in Southeast Asia in terms of population with around 90 million people and is considered 
as one of the most dynamically developing economies in the region. With good quality, 
Japanese products are specially favored by Vietnamese people. Japan is now the third biggest 
import market of Vietnam, making up 10.2 percent of the total imports (see Figure 2). There 
are three categories of commodity with the import volume of over US$ 1 billion including 
machinery, computer and steel
191. However, currently, Vietnam‟s imports from Japan 
accounts for only around 8 percent of the total imports from Japan of ASEAN countries (the 
figure for 2012 is 11 billion USD and 130 billion USD respectively
192
). This means that there 
are still opportunities for Japan to penetrate more into Vietnamese market. 
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Figure 2: Top 8 largest exporters to Vietnam in 2012 
 
(Source: Vietnam Economic Times) 
Apart from a considerable source of supply and demand for Japan‟s economy, 
economic relations between Japan and Vietnam also benefit Japanese businesses, especially 
Japanese investors. For a number of Japanese investors, Vietnam is eyed for its cheap labor, 
great potentials in the domestic market and a platform for export to third countries. Moreover, 
according to the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) in Vietnam, after a period of 
time searching for investment opportunities in China, Japanese investors are heading to 
Southeast Asia and Vietnam is considered a potential destination
193
.  Japan is currently the 
largest foreign direct investor in Vietnam. The focused sector is manufacturing industry, 
accounting for over 80 percent
194. In 2012, Japan‟s newly-registered and additional capital 
reached US$5.13 billion, accounting for 40% of total investment commitments to Vietnam. 
There are about 250 Japanese companies operating in Vietnam, among which large Japanese 
corporations have been present with reputable, competitive and high technical content 
products, namely, Sumitomo, Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Toshiba, Toto
195
. A recent 
survey by JETRO on business conditions of Japanese-affiliated firms in Asia and Oceania 
shows that over 60 percent of businesses in Vietnam reported a profit in 2012, higher than the 
57.2 percent recorded in China. Moreover, over one third of Japanese firms in Vietnam 
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believed that 2012 would be much better for them with a profit increase of 13.8 percent over 
the previous year
196
. 
3.2.2. Security and political interests 
As analyzed above, it can be said that Japan – Vietnam relations confer enormous 
economic benefits on Japan‟s economy as well as its investors. However, it does not mean 
that the relations are “purely” economic. Political and security motivations are not very 
visible but really matters behind this relationship. By boosting economic ties with Vietnam 
and supporting economic development of this country, Japan aims to expand its influence in 
Vietnam and Southeast Asia region in its strategy for coming back to Asia. Moreover, as 
Vietnam is a part of Southeast Asia, it is necessary to Japan to promote relations with 
Vietnam in order to maintain peace and stability in Asia.  Former Foreign Minister Kiichi 
Miyazawa had once addressed that, “It is very necessary that Japan should keep a relationship 
of mutual understanding with all of the countries in Southeast Asia, in order to maintain peace 
and stability in Asia”197.   
From a security perspective, Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular has 
become an increasingly important component in Japanese foreign policy, especially amid 
Japan – China growing tensions over Senkaku/Diaoyu Island198 and the China‟s threat. On the 
economic front, China has surpassed Japan as the world‟s second largest economy. Moreover, 
this country is also strengthening its military might with a constant increase in defense budget. 
For example, in 2012, China spent 103.3 billion US. dollars on national defense, an increase 
of 11.5 per cent over the previous year. In 2013, it plans to raise its defense budget by 10.7 
percent to 114.3 billion US.dollars
199
. Therefore, the power gap between Japan and China is 
narrowing, partly leading to China‟s growing assertiveness over their territorial dispute. For 
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example, following the Japan‟s detention of a Chinese fishing boat captain near the oil-rich, 
uninhabited and disputed islands in the East China Sea (known as Senkaku in Japan and 
Diaoyu in China) in September 2010, the Chinese government decided to block exports of 
rare earth minerals to Japan until the captain was released
200
. Two years later, in September 
2012, shortly after the Japanese government signed a contract to purchase three of the five 
main islands that constitute the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, anti-Japan protests erupted 
throughout China, causing a major strain in the two countries‟ relationship201. Moreover, in 
early October 2012 China decided to deploy seven warships through the Miyako Strait 
without alerting the Japanese government, which was viewed by some in Japan as conveying 
displeasure over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
202
. Therefore, with tremendous pressure from China 
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Japan definitely needs to gain support from outsiders as 
well as related parties including Vietnam, which also shares the great concern of maritime 
security. According to General Nguyen Chi Vinh, Vietnam‟s Vice Minister of Defense, Japan 
and Vietnam are facing similar maritime security challenges which include defending their 
own territorial sovereignty in the continental shelf; ensuring the smooth operation of maritime 
traffic; protecting maritime free trade and engaging in maritime disputes
203
.  Furthermore, 
both Japan and Vietnam confirm their stand against China maritime assertiveness and the 
need for abiding the international law to ensure maritime security; and according to a senior 
Japanese Foreign Ministry official, Japan sees Vietnam “as a strategic partner that shares 
common interests”204.  
The important role of Vietnam can be clearly seen in the foreign policy of the new 
government of Japan. The first overseas trip by the newly-elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
in January 2013 was to ASEAN countries in which Vietnam was the first of the three 
destinations. Defense cooperation between Japan and Vietnam has been accelerated in various 
fields, especially since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral 
Defense Cooperation in 2011
205
. Delegation and experience exchanges have been promoted 
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strongly with regular exchanges of high-ranking visits. Furthermore, Japan has efficiently 
assisted Vietnam in training officers for Vietnam People‟s Army206. For example, from 2012, 
a number of troops of the Vietnam Marine Police have received scholarships to study at the 
Japan Coast Guard Academy in Hiroshima City
207
.  
In addition, Japan also needs Vietnam‟s support for its quest to be in the United 
Nations Security Council. The United Nations has become the central element in Japan‟s 
foreign policy ever since it joined the organization in 1956, especially when it faces numerous 
difficulties including severe opposition from many UN members as well as its neighboring 
countries in Northeast Asia. Reinhard Drifte in his book entitled “Japan‟s Quest for a 
Permanent Security Council Seat: A Matter of Pride or Justice” noted that “Japanese foreign 
Ministry officials believe that a permanent seat would fit Japan‟s economic superpower status, 
gain recognition for Japan‟s international contributions, and help rehabilitate Japan‟s from its 
World War II history”208.  Drifte also argued that the greatest external challenge to Japan‟s 
bid is to get the support of a two thirds majority of the UN member states
209
. In this regard, 
Japan has encountered considerable opposition from numerous nations. Japan‟s neighboring 
counterparts in Northeast Asia including North Korea, China, South Korea do not support 
Japan‟s bid. Other UN member states may not be supportive just because they do not want to 
give the United States a second veto
210
. In this context, the support of Vietnam, a country with 
increasingly important status in international arena, especially when this country successful 
accomplished the role as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2008-
2009 tenure and as the chairman of the ASEAN in 2010 is very important for Japan to acquire 
support of other countries in Southeast Asia and in the world. 
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Ban‟ (General Nguyen Chi Vinh Talks about Vietnam – Japan Defense Cooperation) 
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3.3. HOW? 
In implementing its foreign policy toward Vietnam, Japan carries out the “soft” policy 
to attract Vietnam. Therefore, Japan has utilized a variety of measures in its foreign policy 
toward Vietnam in all fields ranging from politics, economy, security, defense, etc. 
First of all, with regard to political measures, Japan has held increasingly numerous 
high level meetings and exchanges with Vietnam. Recently, the bilateral relationship has 
been developed to strategic partnership for peace and prosperity in Asia. Vietnam and Japan 
made 2013 the Vietnam-Japan Friendship Year to mark the 40th anniversary of their 
diplomatic ties. Japan has always supported the Doi Moi (renovation) and opening policy of 
Vietnam. It also positively assisted Vietnam to enter in the region and the world (APEC, 
WTO, ASEM, ARF, etc). It was the first G7 country to recognize Vietnam's market economy 
status in 2011. And Japan expects that Vietnam is a good partner in the ASEAN+3 
framework and the future East Asia Community. 
In addition, economic measures are central in Japan‟s foreign policy in general and 
toward Vietnam in particular. According to Maike Okano-Heijmans, Japan has employed 
economic diplomacy as a central instrument of its foreign policy and quest for national 
security since the post-war period, and to a greater extent than any other nation
211
. Japan 
regards economics as the central field in which it can expand its cooperation with Vietnam in 
other fields. The traditional “triad” of trade, investment and ODA continues to be efficient 
economic tools utilized by Japan in Vietnam. Currently Japan remains Vietnam's leading 
economic partner. It is the largest foreign direct investor in Vietnam. As an illustration, in 
2012, out of the total registered FDI capital of $16.3 billion, Japan accounted for $5.59 billion 
(34.2 percent), which was much greater than the second and the third including Taiwan ($2.6 
billion) and Singapore ($1.9 billion)
212
. With regard to Official Development Assistance, the 
country remains the biggest bilateral Official Development Assistance donor to Vietnam. In 
fiscal year 2012-2013, Japan pledged to grant ODA worth 2.6 billion U.S. dollars to 
Vietnam
213
 out of the total amount of $6.5 billion of commitment ODA from both bilateral 
and multilateral donors. Figure 3 reveals that Vietnam is by far the largest recipient of ODA 
from Japan to the Mekong Delta during the 2007-2011 period (see Figure 3). With regard to 
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trade, Japan has attached great importance to boosting trade with Vietnam. Among a network 
of 72 overseas offices in 55 countries, there are two Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO)
214
 offices in Vietnam (one is in Hanoi; and one is in Ho Chi Minh City). The 
Japanese government started negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement ("Economic 
Partnership Agreement") with Vietnam in January 2007 and the agreement took effect in 
October 2009. Since then bilateral trade has been on the increase. Japan is now the third 
largest trading partner of Vietnam. The two countries are striving to double the bilateral trade 
turnover by 2020, from the US$21.181 billion in 2011
215
. 
 
(Source: Japan’s ODA Data by Country. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) 
Apart from political and economic measures, under the strategic partnership, Japan also 
promotes cooperation in military and defense with Vietnam. Two countries regularly exchange 
high level visits of defense officials.  In 2011, Vietnamese Defense Minister Phung Quang 
Thanh visited Japan for the first time in 13 years as a Vietnamese Defense Minister, holding 
talks with Japan's counterpart. The two ministers signed the memorandum concerning Japan-
Vietnam defense cooperation and exchange, and agreed to promote high-level exchanges, 
regular dialogue at the vice-ministerial level, and cooperation in such areas as humanitarian aid 
and disaster relief
216
. In November 2012, Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Hironori 
Kanazawa visited Vietnam where the first Japan-Vietnam vice-defense ministerial level 
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consultation was held. During the consultation, opinions were exchanged regarding defense 
cooperation and exchange between the two counties, which included capacity-building support, 
and the security of Asia and Pacific regions
217
. Moreover, Japan has cooperated closely with 
Vietnam at multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Regional Security Forum (ARF) and the 
ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+). 
 Furthermore, Japan has also utilized cultural exchange, education and tourism as 
important tools in its foreign Japan‟s foreign policy toward Vietnam as well as to promote its 
influence in this country. Although cultural relations between Japan and Vietnam was 
established long ago, these relations have not been as developed as economic relations. Japan 
has recently adopted various measures to strengthen cultural cooperation with Vietnam. 
Annually, the country grants a considerable amount of non-refundable aid to cultural projects 
in Vietnam. Japan also promotes exchanges of cultural delegations with Vietnam with such 
activities as art performance, exhibitions, film festivals, etc. For example, the Japan – Vietnam 
Friendship Parliamentary Alliance coordinated with the Vietnamese Embassy in Japan to 
organize the 2008 Vietnam Festival in Japan. In 2008 and 2011 Japanese Embassy in Vietnam 
and Vietnamese Ministry of Cultural, Sports and Tourism – Vietnam Grand Music Festival co-
organized the Japan – Vietnam Grand Music Festival in Vietnam. In the field of education and 
training, annually Japan assists Vietnam millions of US dollars in building schools, especially 
in rural and remote areas. Moreover, every year Japanese government grants about 50-60 
scholarships to Vietnamese students to study in Japan. The Japan International Cooperation 
Agency has provided technical and vocational education and training in Japan for many 
Vietnamese staff. As regards tourism, Japan is also a market for the Vietnamese tourism 
industry. The two countries signed the Japan – Vietnam Joint Agreement on tourism 
cooperation in April 2005. Since then, Japan and Vietnam have waived diplomatic and official 
visa requirements. Japan is always one of the top 5 biggest tourist markets for Vietnam. Japan 
effectively supports Vietnam to develop tourism human resources training and development, 
especially Japanese-speaking guides. It has also planned to establish the Office for Japanese 
Tourism Promotion in Vietnam
218
. 
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 With effective measures in various fields ranging from politics, economy, defense to 
culture, education and tourism, Japan has established a strong presence in Vietnam, gradually 
enhancing its influence in Vietnam in all areas. Politically, Japan has strengthened diplomatic 
relations with Vietnam, effectively assisting cooperation in other fields as well as protecting 
Japan‟s political interests in Vietnam and in the region. Economically, Japan has established a 
high level of economic relations with Vietnam which benefits Japanese economy greatly. In 
other areas, Japan has tightened cultural and friendly ties with Vietnamese people, which in 
turn helps build up a positive image of Japan‟s country and people as well as promote 
cooperation in other fields. In this connection, a further insight of Japan‟s public diplomacy in 
Vietnam will be analyzed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: JAPAN’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN VIETNAM AND  
THE CASE-STUDY OF THE SHIP FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA YOUTH 
EXCHANGE PROGRAM 
 
The previous chapter looks at Japan‟s foreign policy toward Vietnam with a thorough 
analysis of Japan‟s interests in Vietnam. This chapter is going to examine how Japan utilizes 
public diplomacy to achieve its foreign policy goals in Vietnam. Apart from public relations 
and cultural exchange, people-to-people exchange serves as one of the efficient tools of 
Japan‟s public diplomacy in Vietnam. A case-study of the Ship for Southeast Asia Youth 
Exchange Program will be used as an illustration. In this connection, two separate surveys 
aiming at the participants to this exchange program and the non-participants are conducted 
simultaneously. The purpose of these surveys is to define the perceptions about Japan by 
Vietnamese people (especially the youth) as well as to examine whether the Ship for 
Southeast Asia Youth Exchange Program helps change the participants‟ views positively, 
which in turn serves Japan‟s foreign policy goals in its relations with Vietnam. 
I.  Overview of Japan’s public diplomacy in Vietnam 
Soft power in general and public diplomacy in particular has garnered great attention 
from Japanese government. Public diplomacy, “as an efficient tool to introduce the good 
aspects of Japan‟s image to the outside world, is considered to be a cornerstone of Japan‟s 
foreign policy as well as its national security in international relations”219.  In its foreign 
policy toward Vietnam, in order to win over the hearts and minds of Vietnamese people, 
Japan has utilized various tools of public diplomacy. Among the most efficient tools are 
public relations, cultural exchange, people-to-people exchange.  
1. Public Relations 
As discussed earlier, public relations in public diplomacy aims at providing foreign 
publics with information about Japan‟s foreign policy as well as its economy, society and 
culture. In Vietnam, Japan has performed this task through various activities. First of all, 
publications about Japan as well as its relations with Vietnam are issued by Japanese 
agencies. For example, to mark the 40
th
 anniversary of diplomatic relations between Japan 
and Vietnam, the Japanese Embassy in Vietnam has published a book entitled “Japan – 
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Vietnam Friendship Year 2013: Towards a New Horizon”. This publication is offered free of 
charge to Vietnamese readers. In addition, the website of the Embassy (www.vn.emb-
japan.go.jp) contains a wealth of information about Japan and Japan – Vietnam relations. The 
website also provides press releases about cooperation activities between Japan and Vietnam. 
Moreover, realizing the power of social networks, the Embassy has set up a facebook account 
on Japan – Vietnam Friendship Year to connect with readers and to update information about 
prominent activities in celebration of the Friendship Year. Moreover, lovers of Japanese 
culture can access the facebook of Japan Foundation Centre for Cultural Exchange to know 
about Japanese cultural activities in Vietnam. Apart from publications, Japan in coordination 
with related Vietnamese authorities has regularly organized various events to introduce 
Japanese culture to Vietnamese people; to name a few, Japan Day, Sakura Festival or Japan – 
Vietnam Grand Music Festival. Japan‟s public relations in Vietnam also deal with conducting 
opinion polls on Japan. For example, in 2008, Japan conducted the opinion poll on Japan in 
six ASEAN countries including in Vietnam. The results revealed that 96 percent of 
respondents from Vietnam viewed the relationship between Japan and Vietnam as very 
friendly or somewhat friendly
220
.  
2. Cultural Exchange 
Cultural exchange is an important component of Japan‟s public diplomacy everywhere 
and in Vietnam it is not an exception.  With the aim of furthering the understanding and trust 
of Japan, traditional culture and art as well as pop culture are primary tools used in cultural 
exchange. Moreover, cultural exchange between Japan and Vietnam also involves Japanese 
language and Japanese studies. Regarding traditional culture, Japan has effectively supported 
Vietnam in its preservation of traditional culture and cultural heritage with its Cultural Grant 
Aid
221. For example, Japan sponsored such projects as “Facilities for archive storage of Sino-
Nom Institute” or “Development of Music for Vietnam National Academy of Music”222. 
Apart from Cultural Grant Aid, Japan has also organized exchanges of cultural and art 
performance between Japan and Vietnam. In this regard, the role of the Japan Foundation (the 
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first organization specializing in international cultural exchange) and the Japanese Embassy in 
Vietnam cannot be ignored. In 2008 the Japan Foundation set up an office in Vietnam naming 
“The Japan Foundation Centre of Cultural Exchange in Vietnam” (hereinafter the Centre), 
which was the fifth overseas office in Southeast Asia. The Centre has carried out various 
activities to foster cultural exchange between Japan and Vietnam in three categories including 
Japanese language, cultural and art exchange and Japanese studies and intellectual exchange. 
With regard to Japanese language, the Centre has promoted Japanese language education in 
Vietnam by sending Japanese-language specialists to Vietnam, inviting Vietnamese teachers 
and students to Japan, providing teaching materials, organizing Japanese-language courses, 
organizing seminars or training courses for Vietnamese teachers, and administering the 
Japanese-language Proficiency Test in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and Danang, etc. 
Furthermore, in coordination with the Ministry of Education and Training of Vietnam, the 
Centre has been implementing the project on “Introduction of Japanese Language into 
Secondary and High School Curriculum during 2003-2013”. In the field of art and cultural 
exchange, Japan has organized art exhibitions, stage performances, music concerts, film 
festivals, academic lectures, and press on Japanese publications translated into Vietnamese, 
etc
223
. For instance, in April 2013 the Japanese consulate in Ho Chi Minh City organized the 
Oishi Nippon Food Fair to celebrate the 40
th
 anniversary of diplomatic ties of Japan and 
Vietnam. In June 2013, the Japan Foundation Centre for Cultural Exchange in Vietnam 
organized a jazz performance with artists from Japan and ASEAN countries including 
Vietnam
224
. Japanese studies and intellectual exchange are also an important element of 
Japan‟s cultural exchange in Vietnam. With the purpose of providing support for Japanese 
studies in Vietnam as well as learning more about Vietnam, Japan has promoted international 
exchange activities with Vietnam including support for Vietnamese organizations and 
scholars of Japanese studies. Specifically, Japan has sponsored conferences or activities of 
Japanese studies held by Vietnam‟s institutes. Moreover, in coordination with Vietnamese 
counterparts, Japan has organized various seminars or lectures on Japan
225
.  
It is undeniable that cultural exchange has contributed greatly to bringing Japanese 
culture closer to Vietnamese people and vice versa. More importantly, an increasing number 
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of Vietnamese people, especially the youth, have developed strong affection for Japanese 
culture. There is the so-called “the Club of Lovers of Japanese Culture” which has been set up 
in many localities around the country such as Hanoi, Thai Nguyen, Danang, etc. This kind of 
“club” is usually formed by a group of Vietnamese youths who love Japan‟s culture and 
desire to exchange with each other. For example, regarding the facebook of the Club of 
Vietnamese lovers of Japanese culture (which was set up in August 2012), as of July 2013, 
there have been over 20,000 likes. Moreover, according to a recent survey conducted by a 
Vietnam‟s well-established website, the majority of respondents (out of 630 persons) chose 
Japanese mangas, especially Doreamon, Conan or Dragon balls as their favourite comics (see 
Figure 4) 
Figure 4: “Which are your favorite comics during your childhood? 
 
(Source: Survey on favourite comics during childhood. Webtretho.com) 
3. People-to-people exchange: 
In an interview, the former Ambassador of Japan to Vietnam Norio Hattori stated that 
“government to government relations are, in the long run, based on people to people relations. 
Therefore, through a variety of personal exchanges, two countries (Japan and Vietnam) can 
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make their bilateral relationship much stronger and deeper
226
. This means that Japan has 
attached great importance to people-to-people exchange in its public diplomacy in Vietnam. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, people-to-people exchange in Japan‟s public diplomacy 
comprises three elements: student exchange, youth exchange and sport exchange.  
3.1. Student exchange 
With regard to student exchange, Japan expects to receive more Vietnamese students 
coming to Japan to acquire knowledge, advanced technology, and understand more about the 
culture and people of Japan. These students when returning to Vietnam can actively 
contribute to the building of their country and become a bridge to strengthen exchanges 
between peoples of the two countries
227
. Vietnam is now among the five major countries with 
over 4,000 students studying in Japan
228
 (as of May 2012) and with concerted efforts of both 
Japan and Vietnam; and the number is expected to increase in the coming years. On the Japan 
side, it has launched a number of initiatives to boost student exchange with Vietnam. Since 
the beginning of the new millennium, the Japanese government has boosted its support for 
Vietnam in the field of education and training education. In March 2008, the two countries 
signed an agreement in which Japan would help to train 1000 PhDs for Vietnam from 2008 to 
2020. During the period of 2000 and 2011, Japan has granted 300 scholarships for 
Vietnamese students to study master programs at famous universities in Japan
229
. Each year 
over 100 scholarships for undergraduate students from Vietnam are granted by the 
government of Japan.  Moreover, hundreds of Vietnamese students have participated in the 
JENESYS 2.0 (the Japan – East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths), a key 
platform for student exchange between Japan and ASEAN. Another example is the exchange 
between the Vietnam – Japan Student Conference (VJSC) and the Japan – Vietnam Student 
Conference (JVSC). Established in 2007 under the sponsorship of the Vietnam – Japan 
Cooperation Centre, the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the Japanese Embassy 
in Vietnam, VJSC is a club of Vietnamese students of Japanese-language from universities in 
Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam. JVSC is a club of students from Japan‟s universities who share 
their love for Vietnam. Annually, VJCS receives students from JVSC to Vietnam to attend 
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numerous activities such as themetic seminars, cultural exchanges, home-stays, visiting 
Japanese companies in Vietnam, etc
230
. 
3.2. Youth exchange 
Apart from student exchange, Japan has also concentrated on organizing youth 
exchange programs with Vietnam with the aim of strengthening solidarity and promoting 
exchange and mutual understanding between young people of Vietnam and Japan. An 
example of bilateral youth exchange programs is the program co-organized in September 
2012 by the Sodateru Association, a social education organization of the Japanese Ministry of 
Education and Science, and the Danang Representative Office in Japan. In this program, 30 
learners of Japanese-language from Danang, Vietnam aged from 16 to 22 had the chance to 
visit Japan for ten days
231
. During their stay, the visitors joined with Japanese students to visit 
some places in Japan as well as to participate in cultural exchange activities. Multilateral 
youth exchange programs held by Japan with the participation of Vietnam‟s youth are more 
diverse. The JENESYS 2.0 which was mentioned above is a prominent example. Another 
example is the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program (SSEAYP). Vietnam 
officially joined this program in 1996. Since then, annually, 28 Vietnamese young people join 
with the youths from Japan and other ASEAN countries in a two-month voyage from Japan to 
five Southeast Asian countries. The program helps promote friendship and mutual 
understanding among the youths of the ten Southeast Asian countries including Vietnam and 
Japan. 
3.3. Sports exchange 
Sports exchange between Japan and Vietnam has also constituted an important part of 
Japan‟s people-to-people exchange with Vietnam, especially recently. A number of Japanese 
martial arts such as judo, karate or aikido have become popular sports in Vietnam. Moreover, 
Japan has endeavored to introduce its traditional sports to Vietnamese people. One example is 
the introduction of the oldest extant Japanese martial arts, the non-physical cultural heritage 
of Japan, to Vietnamese people in the seminar on Tenshin Shoden Katori Shinto-ryu
232
. 
Recently, to mark the 40
th
 anniversary of diplomatic relations between two countries, sports 
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exchange between Japan and Vietnam has been promoted actively. In June 2013, in Hanoi the 
Vietnam‟s national U23 team played a friendly match with Japan‟s Kashima Antlers. In Ho 
Chi Minh City, also in June 2013 the Kawasaki Frontale Football Club from Japan played 
with the Club of Becamex Binh Duong from Vietnam. 
All in all, Japan has utilized various dimensions in its public diplomacy in Vietnam. It 
especially specializes in public relations, cultural exchange and people-to-people exchange. 
Public relations has done a good job in informing Vietnamese people of Japan and its 
relations with Vietnam. Moreover, it has also connected “lovers” of Japan and provided them 
with opportunities to experience Japanese culture in Vietnam. Cultural exchange has helped 
bring Japanese culture closer to Vietnamese people, especially the youth.  People-to-people 
exchange in its various forms including student, youth and sports exchange has fostered 
mutual understanding, contributing to the enhancement of friendship and cooperation between 
Japan and Vietnam. So far, it can be concluded that Japan has devoted a great deal of efforts 
in its public diplomacy in Vietnam. The outcome of these efforts will be analyzed in the next 
section with the case-study of the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program. 
II. The Case-study of the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program  
1. Overview of the Program 
1.1. History of Establishment and Development 
The Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Program (SSEAYP) is an annual program 
sponsored by the Government of Japan and coordinated by the all member-countries of 
ASEAN with the purpose of promoting friendship, solidarity and mutual understanding 
among the youths from Southeast Asian countries and Japan. Furthermore, the program also 
helps broaden their perspective on the world as well as strengthen their motivations and 
abilities of international cooperation
233
. 
The SSEAYP started in January 1974 based on the respective Joint Statements issued 
between Japan and the five ASEAN countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. In 1985, Brunei Darussalam joined the program. Vietnam officially 
became a member of SSEAYP in 1996. Two years later, in 1998 both Laos and Myanmar 
joined the program after their admission to ASEAN in 1997. Cambodia was the last country 
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in ASEAN to participate in SSEAYP in 2000 following its admission this regional 
arrangement in 1999
234
. 
Annually the Government of Japan spends from 7 to 10 million US dollars to organize 
the SSEAYP, which includes the fees for renting the ship
235
; accommodation, meals and 
transportation for all participants in Japan; air tickets for participants from their home countries 
to the first port of call and from Japan to their home countries. Governments of ASEAN 
countries bear local the expenses which include organizing welcoming and send-off ceremony, 
courtesy calls and receptions, home-stays, institutional visits and interactions with local youths, 
etc
236
. 
1.2. Participants 
There are 11 contingents from Japan and ten Southeast Asian countries. Before 1996, 
each contingent comprised of 42 participants to the program (including 01 National Leader, 
01 Youth Leaders and 40 members). Since 1996, due to the increasing number of countries 
joining the program, the members of each contingent has reduced to 29 (01 NL, 01 YL, 
01AYL and 26 PYs, see Figure 5 below). Therefore, each year there are more than 300 youths 
from Japan and ASEAN participating in SSEAYP. 
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Figure 5: Composition of a SSEAYP Contingent 
 
Participating Youths (Pys) to SSEAYP must be between 18 and 30 years of age. 
Youth Leader (YL) is selected among participating youths to be their leader. Assistant Youth 
Leader (AYL) is the assistant of YL and can act on behalf of YL when necessary. National 
Leader (NL) is the head of each contingent and sits on the Cruise Operating Committee 
(COC). NL is usually from 30 to 39 years old and comes from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
each country. To participate in the activities both onboard the ship and in the visiting 
countries, participants have to be fluent in English. Good health is another important 
requirement for them as they have to experience a long voyage in hard conditions.  
Furthermore, participants should have an understanding about Japan and participating 
countries, especially those being port of calls. They have to be able to participate throughout 
the program. There is no chance for anyone to participate in SSEAYP as an YL, AYL or a PY 
for a second time, except for being the National Leader
237
. 
1.3. Activities 
Previously (before 2005), the program usually started in Japan. National Leaders of all 
contingents would gather in Japan onboard the ship Nippon Maru. The Ship then departed for 
one of ASEAN countries as the first port of call to collect participating youths who had 
gathered there. The final port of call would be Japan, where all participants would have 10 
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days of activities before leaving for their home countries. After 2005, all NLs join PYs going 
to the first port of call.  
SSEAYP lasts for fifty-two days during the fourth quarter of the year. During this 
period, the ship visits Japan and five countries in Southeast Asia. Annually the Organizing 
Committee will select 5 out of 10 countries in ASEAN as port of calls. Throughout the 
program the participants engage in activities onboard the ship and activities in the countries to 
be visited. Onboard activities are monitored by the Cruise Operating Committee which 
comprises of national leaders of eleven contingents. The Administrator, who is Japanese, is 
responsible for the overall program. The main activities on the ship include National 
Presentation, Discussions, Solidarity and Club activities and other activities approved by the 
COC. Activities in the countries being port of call include welcoming and send-off ceremony, 
courtesy calls and receptions, home-stay, cultural exchange, institutional visits, open ship, etc. 
2. Vietnam’s participation into SSEAYP 
In 1995, the National Committee for Vietnamese Youths sent a delegation of 8 
members to participate into SSEAYP as observers. In 1996, following its admission to 
ASEAN, Vietnam officially sent 42 members to SSEAYP and organized the ship welcoming 
ceremony in Saigon port, Ho Chi Minh City. The participants were warmly received by 
Vietnam‟s National Leader at the Presidential Palace. In 1997, the Vietnam‟s contingent in 
SSEAYP comprised of 33 participants.  The SSEAYP ship also docked in Ho Chi Minh City. 
The program participants were received by Vietnam‟s State President. 1998 marked the 25th 
anniversary of the SSEAYP; and Vietnam also sent 33 persons to participate in the program. 
In 1999 Vietnam contributed 32 delegates to the program. One year later, in 2000, 30 
Vietnamese youths attended the SSEAYP. In 2001, Vietnam had 28 participating youths and 
01 National Leader joining the program.  Since 2002, the number of participants of Vietnam 
and other contingents has been fixed to 28PYs and 01 NL
238
. 
Both Nippon Maru and Fuji Maru could not habour in any ports in the Northern 
Vietnam, where Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam is located. The ship can only dock in Saigon 
port in the South or Danang port in the Central Vietnam. Since Vietnam first joined SSEAYP 
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in 1996, it has welcomed 12 SSEAYP ships. Due to limited budget, only leaders of each 
contingent can fly to the North to pay courtesy calls on National Leaders of Vietnam
239
. 
Thus, the overall activity of the Ship for Southeast Asia Youth Exchange Program is 
oriented to help enhance solidarity and mutual understanding among the youths of Japan and 
Southeast Asia including Vietnam. Moreover, as participants have the chance to experience 
life in Japan and with Japanese people, the program is one of the means of Japan‟s public 
diplomacy which help spread the values and information about Japan. Furthermore, according 
to Mrs Lim Hwee Hua, Minister in Prime Minister‟s Office of Singapore in her speech at the 
welcoming ceremony of the 36
th
 SSEAYP, the program “signifies the close ties that ASEAN 
and Japan share”240. Therefore, it is possible to believe that Japan‟s public diplomacy as well 
as SSEAYP is serves as an efficient tool to enhance Japan‟s soft power in Southeast Asia 
generally and in Vietnam particularly. This will be further consolidated by consulting the 
results of two separate surveys which examines whether the SSEAYP helps enhance Japan‟s 
soft power in Vietnam by comparing the perceptions about Japan (which are correspondent 
with Japan‟s national interests in Vietnam) between those of the participants and the non-
participants.  
3. Description of the Surveys 
The research is based on first-hand information and was conducted in two months 
from July to August 2013. The major purpose of these surveys is to explore perceptions about 
Japan by Vietnamese people in general and by participants of the Southeast Asian Youth 
Exchange Program (SSEAYP) in particular and to examine whether the SSEAYP helps 
enhance Japan‟s soft power in Vietnam. 
As analyzed previously, the Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program is a tool of 
Japan‟s public diplomacy with an aim to foster friendship and mutual understanding among 
the youths from Japan and ASEAN countries. Moreover, participants of this program also 
have the chance to visit Japan as well as to live and work with Japanese people; therefore, 
after the program, they may change their own perceptions about Japan. Therefore, in order to 
evaluate the impact of the program on the perceptions of participants, two surveys were 
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conducted anonymously. The first survey was performed amongst the participants of the 
Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program (participants). The second survey aimed at those 
who had never participated into this program (non-participants).  
Due to the age limitation of the program (which is from 18 to 30 years old for 
participating youths and about 40 years old for national leaders), the target group of the first 
research are adults over 18 years old. These people were members in different batches of the 
Vietnam contingent in the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program since Vietnam 
first joined the program in 1996. However, due to the difficulties in contacting the 
participants, especially those participated in the program long ago, the majority of the 
interviewees participated into the program just a few years ago (from 2003 to 2012). 
Therefore, most interviewees of the first survey are in the group age of 18-25 or 26-35. As 
occupation may well exert an impact on the perception about a country, the survey tried to 
cover interviewees of a variety of occupation categories. The gender of the respondents was 
not taken into account because it was not an important element affecting perceptions of 
people about a country. Whether the participants joined any other program or event hosted by 
Japan is also an important factor because their perceptions about Japan may have been 
affected by that program/event, not the SSEAYP. 
The second survey targeted those who had never joined the SSEAYP and the majority 
of this group included young people from 18 to 35 years old. One consideration of this survey 
was whether the respondents had participated in any program or event hosted by Japan. 
The main limitation of the survey is the final number of questionnaires used for 
analysis. As the main target group was participants of the Southeast Asian Youth Exchange 
Program, this survey was conducted first. Questionnaires were sent to hundreds of 
interviewees and due to the fact that many participants may have changed their addresses, 
emails or phone numbers, 50 questionnaires were received. Then, out of these respondents, 
those who had participated in other program/event hosted by Japan apart from the SSEAYP 
were disregarded. Moreover, the questionnaires which missed the answers or chose more than 
one answer instead of one were disqualified. Finally, 46 questionnaires were used for 
analysis. Among the respondents, the vast majority was in the age group of 26-35 years old 
(32/46 or 71 per cent), 20 per cent were from 18 to 25 years old and only 9 per cent were over 
35. The respondents worked in a wide variety of job categories including finance/banking, 
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education/training, government/politics, law, medicine, engineering and others. The second 
survey was aimed to receive 46 questionnaires which were qualified for analysis. The 
questionnaires were sent to about 70 non-participants of similar age groups and occupation 
categories with the participants. Around 60 questionnaires were received. Five questionnaires 
filled by interviewees who had participated in any program or event hosted by Japan were 
removed. Then 46 questionnaires were selected randomly for analysis. 
 The questionnaires of two surveys were similar, comprising of 10 questions. A slight 
difference was in the general question. In the first survey, interviewees (participants) were 
asked if they had attended any other program or event hosted by Japan. In the second survey, 
interviewees (non-participants) were questioned whether they had attended any program or 
event hosted by Japan. The questions were designed to be correspondent with Japan‟s 
interests in Vietnam which include economic benefits (export, import and labor market) and 
political support (for Japan‟s bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat; for its territorial 
dispute with China) and general questions. 
 Question 1 and question 2 were aimed to examine the support of the respondents 
towards Japan‟s involvement in Vietnam as well as its contribution to Vietnam‟s economy. 
Question 3, question 4 and question 5 were formed to see how the interviewees support Japan 
politically. Question 6 is used to define the interviewees‟ attitude and their preference about 
Japan‟s attractiveness. The answers to this question can help reveal sources of Japan‟s soft 
power in Vietnam. Question 7, 8, 9 and 10 were to identify whether the respondents advocate 
Japan‟s economic interests in terms of investment, market and labor supply from Vietnam. 
The countries were used as options for answers include China, the United States, Russia, 
South Korea, India and Germany because of a number of reasons. Firstly, Japan and these 
countries are all major economic partners of Vietnam. Both China and the United States are 
among Vietnam‟s largest trading partners (China is the largest import market of Vietnam; and 
the United States is Vietnam‟s largest export market excluding the EU). Therefore, it is 
apparent that both China and the United States have contributed greatly to the development of 
Vietnam‟s economy. Moreover, as a big neighbor of Vietnam, China holds an important 
position in Vietnam‟s foreign policy. In addition, South Korea is among the largest donor of 
ODA to Vietnam. It is also a key trade and investment partner of Vietnam. Especially, Korean 
products especially consumer goods and cultural products have prevailed Vietnam‟s market. 
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Vietnamese people are increasingly fond of Made-in-Korea products such as Samsung mobile 
phones or K-pop and Korean drama. And Russia, given the special relationship between the 
former USSR and Vietnam in history, is still an important partner of Vietnam in terms of both 
political and economic domain. Lastly, apart from Japan, India and Germany are among the 
countries which are bidding for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. 
  There are several limitations of the surveys. Firstly, some respondents, especially the 
non-participants did not know about the territorial dispute between Japan and China as well as 
the role of a permanent member in the UN Security Council. Secondly, the images of Japan 
and the United States in Vietnam were so large that they overshadowed those of the others 
including Russia and India. Thirdly, there should have been more options in each question to 
have more precise results. Lastly, a number of questions seemed to favor Japan, especially 
when the majority of Vietnamese people usually do not want to support China. 
4. Analysis of the Results 
The general questions helped select the respondents who did not participated in any 
other program or event organized by Japan apart from the SSEAYP (in the first survey) and 
who had never participated in any program or event hosted by Japan (in the second survey). 
Therefore, it can efficiently serve the purpose of examining perceptions about Japan by 
participants of the SSEAYP in comparison with those of the non-participants. 
 The understanding and preference about Japan (Question No. 6 “Which aspects of 
Japan are you most impressed with?”) differs greatly amongst participants and non-
participants. As participants had the chance to experience life in Japan and with Japanese 
people, many of them liked Japanese culture and its people. And those who had never visited 
Japan or joined any activities organized by Japan tended to be impressed by Japanese 
economy. This can be concluded the SSEAYP helped bring the Japan‟s culture and people 
closer to the participants; and therefore, these people can have more positive views about the 
culture and people of Japan than the non-participants. 
Figure 6: The results for Question 6:“Which aspects of Japan are you most impressed 
with?” amongst participants. 
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  (Source: Hereafter the graphs are based on the results of the surveys conducted in 
Vietnam, July-August 2013) 
Nearly half of the respondents were impressed by Japanese people. Many of them 
liked Japan‟s culture. 18 percent admired the economy of Japan. And none of them did not 
choose any aspect. 
Figure 7: The result for Question 6:“Which aspects of Japan are you most impressed 
with?” amongst non-participants. 
 
The answers to Q.6 amongst non-participants differ greatly from the answers among 
participants. Just nearly a half of the non-participants liked Japanese culture and people (22% 
and 27% respectively) while the majority of the participants were impressed by these aspects 
of Japan. 
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Figure 8: The results for Question 1 “Which country has played the most important 
role in the development of Vietnam‟s economy?” amongst participants. 
 
Figure 9: The result for Question 1 “Which country has played the most important 
role in the development of Vietnam‟s economy?” amongst non- participants. 
 
Non-participants also prioritized Japan; however, only nearly a half of non-
participants (44%) chose Japan as opposed to 60% of the participants. 
Figure 10. The result for Question 2 “Which country is the most important partner (in 
both political and economic realm) of Vietnam?” amongst participants. 
60
20
20
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Japan
China
The US
Russia
The results for Q.1 (participants)
Percentage of interviewees
44
18
33
4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Japan
China
The US
Russia
The results for Q.1 (non-participants)
Percentage of interviewees
70 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 11. The result for Question 2 “Which country is the most important partner (in both 
political and economic realm) of Vietnam?” among non-participants. 
 
Both the respondents of participants and non-participants chose China as the most 
important partner in terms of economics and politics of Vietnam. This is due to the fact that 
China shared the similar political system with Vietnam and it was the largest trading partner 
of this country. However, more respondents of participants supported Japan than the non-
participants (30% and 24% respectively). 
 Figure 12. The results for Question 3: “Which country would you support to be a 
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council?” amongst participants. 
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 The vast majority of interviewees of the first survey (participants) (85%) supported 
Japan for its bid for a permanent seat in the United National Security Council due to its higher 
political role than India in the Asian region and its great contribution to the development of 
Vietnam, especially in the infrastructure sector.  
 Figure 13. The results for Question 3: “Which country would you support to be a 
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council?” amongst non-participants. 
 
 Overall, it is clear that the participants of the SSEAYP have shown much greater 
political support for Japan than the non-participants. However, two thirds of the respondents 
(67%) of the second survey is an impressive number. It is surprising that Germany, despite its 
high role in the EU, was not highly appreciated by respondents of both surveys. Only 2% of 
the interviewees in each survey supported Germany for its bid for a permanent UN Security 
Council seat. 
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Figure 14. The results for Question 4: “Which country deserves to be the regional 
leader in East Asia?” amongst participants. 
 
 
Figure 15. The results for Question 4: “Which country deserves to be the regional 
leader in East Asia?” amongst non-participants. 
 
 Because of the high level development in both economic and political domains of 
Japan, a great proportion of interviewees in the two surveys (74% and 65% consequently) 
supported this country as the leader in East Asia. However, due to the close relationship 
between Vietnam and Russia in history, Russia is ranked the second in terms of support for its 
leadership in the region with 17% and 26% respectively. 
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Figure 16. The results for Question 5: “Which country would you support in the 
territorial dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands?” amongst participants. 
 
Figure 17. The result for Question 5: “Which country would you support in the 
territorial dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands?” amongst non-participants. 
 
With regard to the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the similar 
percentage of respondents in the two surveys (57% and 46%) supported Japan. None of the 
interviewees advocated China. The interviewees of the second survey (the non-participants) 
showed little understanding in the political issue involving Japan; therefore, nearly half of 
the respondents had no idea about this issue while the figure for the participants was only 
22%. 
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Figure 18. The results for Question 7: “If there are four foreign companies planning to 
invest in Vietnam on similar conditions, which company should be given preference?” 
amongst participants. 
 
 Figure 19. The results for Question 7: “If there are four foreign companies planning to 
invest in Vietnam on similar conditions, which company should be given preference?” 
amongst non-participants. 
 
The answers to Q.7 rise to 50% for Japan amongst the participants of the SSEAYP 
from the figure of 43% amongst the non-participants. The United States seems to be 
advocated strongly in terms of its investment in Vietnam with 43% and 46% respectively. 
Chinese companies were not welcomed by the respondents in both surveys. Overall, Japanese 
companies have high reputation in Vietnam. It could be a good condition for Japanese 
enterprises to do business in this country. 
50
0
41
9
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Japanese
Chinese
American
Russian
The Results for Q.7 (participants)
Percentage of interviewees
43
4
46
7
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Japanese
Chinese
American
Russian
The Results for Q.7 (non-participants)
Percentage of interviewees
75 
 
 
 
Figure 20. The results for Question 8: “Which country of origin do you prefer when 
purchasing a laptop if the price is the same?” amongst participants. 
 
Figure 21. The results for Question 8: “Which country of origin do you prefer when 
purchasing a laptop if the price is the same?” amongst non-participants. 
 
Respondents of both surveys showed great interest in Japanese laptop brands with the 
high support of 67% and 54% respectively. Moreover, the American brands were also favored 
strongly by the interviewees with 41 percent of the non-participants choosing an American 
brand. 
Figure 22. The results for Question 9: “If you have your own business, which country 
would you like to export your products to, if the conditions offered are the same?” amongst 
participants. 
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Figure 23. The results for Question 9: “If you have your own business, which country 
would you like to export your products to, if the conditions offered are the same?” amongst 
non-participants. 
 
Japan continued to be the leading country which gained the highest support of the 
respondents of both surveys. However, the interviewees who were the participants tended to 
have more support for Japan as the export market than the non-participants with 43 percent 
and 39 percent respectively. 
Figure 24. The results for Question 10: “If you have to work overseas, which country 
would you opt for?” amongst participants. 
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Figure 25. The results for Question 10: “If you have to work overseas, which country 
would you opt for?” amongst non-participants. 
 
The majority of the respondents of the two surveys (76% and 67%) were eager to 
choose Japan as the place of work overseas. This may be due to the fact that in comparison 
with the rest three countries in Asia, Japan was considered to be more developed and 
attractive. However, partly because of the influence of the mass media, especially through K-
Pop and Korean drama, many non-participants seemed to be more excited about South Korea 
with 26 percent opting for this country. China and Russia continued to be an uninteresting 
option.  
Overall, the tendency of supporting Japan amongst both the participants of the Ship 
for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program and the non-participants was quite strong. 
76
4
17
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Japan
China
South Korea
Russia
The Results for Q.10 (participants)
Percentage of interviewees
67
2
26
4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Japan
China
South Korea
Russia
The Results for Q.10 (non-participants)
Percentage of interviewees
78 
 
 
 
However, the participants tended to be more enthusiastic about Japan with higher support. 
The answers can be regarded as relatively objective. Due to historical factors and the current 
situation with the penetration of Chinese harmful products in Vietnam‟s market as well as the 
assertiveness of China in the territorial dispute over the South China Sea, China was not an 
option in most cases. However, many respondents of both surveys had to acknowledge that 
China was still an important partner of Vietnam and it contributed greatly to the development 
of the Vietnam‟s economy. Interestingly, despite the historical issue with the United States, 
this country was viewed positively by many respondents with higher support than South 
Korea.  
A surprising result is the low level of support for Russia. This is understandable 
because the Russia‟s involvement in Vietnam, especially in everyday life is not very “visible” 
nowadays. Moreover, as the vast majority of the two surveys were young adults, few of them 
remembered or received the great assistance of the former USSR (Russia today) to Vietnam 
during the hard old days. 
To conclude, the high support for Japan amongst both participants and non-
participants demonstrates that the image of Japan is quite good in Vietnam. This result also 
corresponds with the results of other surveys conducted in Vietnam. For example, the Opinion 
Poll on Japan in six ASEAN countries conducted in 2008 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Japan revealed that 96 percent of the interviewees viewed the relationship between 
Vietnam and Japan friendly; 32% considered Japan to be a potential important partner of 
Vietnam in the coming years
241
. However, the participants have shown stronger support for 
Japan than the non-participants. This means that the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth 
Exchange Program may have influenced the participants‟ perceptions about Japan. Moreover, 
as these perceptions are correspondent with Japan‟s interests in Vietnam including both 
political and economic benefits, it can be said that the Program has proved a level of 
effectiveness in enhancing Japan‟s soft power in this country. 
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CONCLUSION 
Soft power has been considered as an importance source for Japan to project its power 
for its political and economic interests in another countries including Vietnam. With the duty 
of improving Japan‟s national image abroad or enhancing its soft power, public diplomacy 
has been utilized by Japan in various areas. Among other tools, youth exchange program is an 
important tool of Japan‟s public diplomacy. 
This research attempts to address the following questions: 
Is public diplomacy an effective tool to enhance Japan’s soft power in Vietnam? 
Are youth exchange programs as a tool of Japan’s public diplomacy help enhance 
Japan’s soft power in Vietnam? 
To answer these questions, the research will analyze both the analytical and empirical 
sides of the argument. Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical framework of soft power, the non-
material form of power, and public diplomacy; in which public diplomacy is considered as 
one of the efficient tools to enhance a country‟s soft power.  In chapter 2, Japan is used as an 
empirical work with an analysis of the dimensions of its soft power and public diplomacy 
strategy. A detailed discussion of public diplomacy in Japan will be initiated to examine 
whether Japan‟s public diplomacy is an effective tool to enhance its soft power or not. 
Chapter 3 looks at Japan‟s foreign policy toward Vietnam with a thorough analysis of Japan‟s 
economic and political interests in Vietnam. Chapter 4 analyzes Japan‟s public diplomacy 
strategies in Vietnam and describes two separate surveys to examine the effectiveness of 
youth exchange programs in enhancing Japan‟s soft power in this country.  
The theoretical framework of this research is based on Nye‟s definition and 
development of soft power and public diplomacy. Nye defined soft power as “the ability to 
get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion”242. In this connection, a 
country‟s soft power, according to Nye, is “its ability to influence events through persuasion 
and attraction rather than military or financial coercion”243. Soft power can derive from major 
resources including culture, values and foreign policies. If these resources are attractive, they 
can incite admiration and respect in other parts of the world. Therefore, soft power can exert 
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great influence on the perceptions of foreign public about a country. These perceptions are 
important for a country to achieve its national interests in another country.  
“Public diplomacy is an instrument that government uses to mobilize resources of soft 
power to communicate with and attract the public of other countries, rather than merely their 
governments”244.  The relationship between soft power and public diplomacy is absolutely 
clear. According to Nye, public diplomacy in various forms has a long history as a means of 
promoting a country‟s soft power245. The effectiveness of a country‟s public diplomacy in 
another country can be reflected in perceptions or views of the local public about that country. 
These perceptions or views are usually collected through opinion polls or surveys. 
Both soft power and public diplomacy seem to be relatively new concepts in Japan. In 
2002 the article written by McGray entitled “Japan‟s Gross National Cool” garnered great 
attraction with the argument that “Japan is becoming a superpower again, but it's not 
becoming a military superpower or an economic superpower. Instead, it's becoming a 
superpower of mass culture, an arena where the United States has reigned supreme for the 
past few decades”246. Soon after that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan began to include 
soft power strategies in is foreign policies with the spreading of Japanese culture to the 
outside world. Gradually, apart from culture, Japan has utilized different resources and tools 
including public diplomacy to project its soft power in other countries. With public 
diplomacy, Japan expects to exert positive influence on the understanding of foreign people 
about Japan. The analysis of Japan‟s public diplomacy in Vietnam in Chapter 4 demonstrated 
that Japan has devoted great efforts to various tools of public diplomacy in this country and 
youth exchange program is an example. The Ship for Southeast Asia Youth Exchange 
Program was analyzed as a case-study and two surveys were conducted to target participants 
of this program and the non-participants. The structure of the survey questionnaires was 
designed to define how Japan was viewed by the interviewees and whether these views were 
correspondent with Japan‟s foreign policy goals or national interests in Vietnam. With the 
purpose of comparing the perceptions of the participants and those of the non-participants 
about some issues in relation to Japan, the surveys can help evaluate the effectiveness of the 
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program (as a tool of Japan‟s public diplomacy) in serving Japan‟s national interests in 
Vietnam. More specifically, the surveys can help define whether the Ship for Southeast Asia 
Youth Exchange Program provides Japan with the ability to get what it wants (economic and 
political-security interests) through attraction (admiration and respect from the participants 
who would support Japan‟s foreign policy goals in Vietnam). In other words, the surveys can 
help identify whether the program contributes to the enhancement of Japan‟s soft power in 
Vietnam.  
The results revealed that Vietnamese people (both participants of the SSEAYP and the 
non-participants) have shown great interest in Japan and supported Japan economically and 
politically. There may be other factors other than public diplomacy which further a good 
image or soft power of Japan in Vietnam. These factors could include the popular “prejudice” 
about China among Vietnamese people because of the assertiveness of China in the South 
China Sea and the massive influx of harmful “made-in-China” products in Vietnam. 
Moreover, Japan has a higher level of development in comparison with its regional 
counterparts including China, South Korea or Russia. Another factor is the impact of Japan‟s 
ODA in Vietnam. As the largest donor of ODA to Vietnam, Japan can win over the hearts and 
minds of Vietnamese people. The surveys also showed that the role of the United States and 
South Korea was been viewed increasingly important by the respondents. Russia should 
invest more to strengthen its attraction to Vietnamese youths because these people did not 
view it as an important and attractive nation to Vietnam.  
As the survey results showed that the participants of the Ship for Southeast Asian 
Youth Exchange Program supported Japan stronger than the non-participants, the role of 
public diplomacy cannot be ignored. It can be said that public diplomacy in general and the 
youth exchange program in particular contribute to promoting Japan‟s soft power in Vietnam. 
In other words, public diplomacy is a useful tool because it helps constitute positive 
perceptions among Vietnamese people about Japan. Moreover, the Ship for Southeast Asian 
Youth Exchange Program turned out to be efficient in enhancing Japan‟s soft power in 
Vietnam as the participants‟ views were correspondent with Japan‟s foreign policy goals in 
their country. However, it is obvious that there should be a wider scope of survey to produce a 
more precise conclusion. And a further study of public diplomacy of a certain country other 
than Japan (for example, the United States or South Korea) or a research on another tool of 
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Japan‟s public diplomacy apart from youth exchange programs can be conducted. It would be 
interesting to compare their effectiveness and to define which tool of Japan‟s public 
diplomacy is the most efficient in enhancing a country‟s soft power in Vietnam. 
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 This questionnaire is part of a research aimed at exploring resources of Japan’s soft 
power and analyzing how public diplomacy as a tool of soft power can help enhance Japan’s soft 
power in Vietnam. The main purpose of this survey is to define whether the Ship for Southeast 
Asia Youth Exchange Program helps enhance Japan’s soft power in Vietnam by comparing the 
perceptions about Japan between those of the participants and the non-participants. Thank you 
for your cooperation. 
----- 
Please cross (X) to choose 
 
A – General questions 
 
Sex:  [  ]  Male     [  ]  Female 
 
Age:  [  ]18-25  [  ]26-35  [  ]35+ 
 
Occupation:  
[  ]  Arts/Performance/Music 
[ ]  Business/Finance 
[ ]  Journalism/Media 
[ ]  Community/Social Service 
[ ]  Education/Training 
[ ]  Entrepreneur 
[ ]  Government/Politics 
[ ]  Law 
[ ]  Medicine 
[ ]  Research 
[ ]  Technology/Engineer 
[ ]  Other 
For participants 
Have you participated in other programs or events organized by Japan apart from SSEAYP?  
[ ]  Yes 
[ ]  No 
If yes, please specify 
 
 
 
 
For non-participants 
Have you participated in any programs or events organized by Japan?  
[  ]  Yes 
[ ]  No 
If yes, please specify 
 
B – SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
1. Which country has played the most important role in the development of Vietnam’s 
economy? 
A. Japan  [  ]  
B. China  [  ]  
C. The United States [ ]  
D. Russia  [  ]  
 
2. Which country is the most important partner (in both political and economic realm) of 
Vietnam? 
A. Japan  [  ]  
B. China  [  ]  
C. United States [ ]  
D. Russia  [  ]  
 
3. Which country would you support to be a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council? 
A. Japan  [  ]  
B. India  [  ]  
C. South Korea [ ]  
D. None  [  ]  
 
4. Which country deserves to be the regional leader in East Asia? 
A. Japan  [  ]  
B. China  [  ]  
C. India  [  ]  
D. Russia  [  ]  
 
5. Which country would you support in the territorial dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku island? 
A. Japan  [  ]  
B. China  [  ]  
C. None  [  ]  
D. No idea  [  ]  
 
6. Which aspect of Japan are you most impressed with? 
A. Culture      [  ]  
B. People  [  ]  
C. Economy  [ ]  
D. None of the above [ ]  
 
7. If there are four following foreign companies planning to invest in Vietnam on similar 
conditions, which company should be given preference? 
A. Japanese  [  ]  
B. Chinese  [  ]  
C. American  [  ]  
D. Russia  [  ]  
 
8. Which country of origin do you prefer when purchasing a laptop if the price is the same? 
A. Japan  [  ]  
B. China  [  ]  
C. The US  [ ]  
D. South Korea  [  ]  
 
9. If you have your own business, which country would you like to export your products to, 
if the conditions offered are the same? 
A. Japan  [  ]  
B. China  [  ]  
C. The US  [ ]  
D. Russia  [  ]  
 
10. If you have to work overseas, which country would you opt for? 
A.  Japan  [  ]  
B. China  [  ]  
C. South Korea [ ]  
D. Russia  [  ]  
 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation! If you would like to add anything else in 
relation to this survey, please feel free to write below. 
